Pattishall IP Blog

June 14, 2017

Drake Copied Jimmy Smith’s Rap. But Court Says it’s not Copyright Infringement, it’s Transformative Fair Use.

Filed under: Copyright, Litigation — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 9:42 am

By Jason Koransky

Jimmy Smith is considered to have been one of the most influential and accomplished organists in the history of jazz. His soulful and swinging Hammond B-3 playing cemented the organ as a fixture in jazz, and laid the musical groundwork for generations of players to come. And while Smith, who died in 2005, was not known for his rapping, on the last track of his 1982 album Off The Top, he laid down the track “Jimmy Smith Rap,” which is a spoken word narrative about the album’s recording session. The “rap” goes as follows:

Good God Almighty, like back in the old days.

You know, years ago they had the A&R men to tell you what to play, how to play it and you know whether it’s disco rock, but we just told Bruce that we want a straight edge jazz so we got the fellas together Grady Tate, Ron Carter, George Benson, Stanley Turrentine.

Stanley was coming off a cool jazz festival, Ron was coming off a cool jazz festival. And we just went in the studio and we did it.

We had the champagne in the studio, of course, you know, compliments of the company and we just laid back and did it.

Also, Grady Tate’s wife brought us down some home cooked chicken and we just laid back and we was chomping on chicken and having a ball.

Jazz is the only real music that’s gonna last. All that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow. But jazz was, is and always will be.

We may not do this sort of recording again, I may not get with the fellas again. George, Ron, Grady Tate, Stanley Turrentine.

So we hope you enjoy listening to this album half as much as we enjoyed playing it for you.

Because we had a ball.

There’s nothing particularly enlightening or interesting about the “rap,” but I included all the words for a reason — it became the subject of a copyright case pitting jazz against rap.

Hip-hop artist Drake is not known for jazz organ, yet he’s become one of the most popular rappers on the planet. He apparently also has an ear for jazz. On his 2013 album Nothing Was The Same, he recorded “Pound Cake/Paris Morton Music 2,” on which Drake samples about 35 seconds of “Jimmy Smith Rap,” including the following lines:

Good God Almighty, like back in the old days.

You know, years ago they had the A&R men to tell you what to play, how to play it and  you know whether it’s disco rock, but we just went in the studio and we did it.

We had champagne in the studio, of course, you know, compliments of the company, and we just laid back and did it.

So we hope you enjoy listening to this album half as much as we enjoyed playing it for you. Because we had a ball.

Only real music is gonna last, all that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow.

A comparison between Smith’s text and Drake’s rap shows that Drake sampled a substantial portion of Smith’s work. While Drake and his record label obtained a license for the sound recording of “Jimmy Smith Rap,” they did not obtain a license for the composition. This led to Smith’s estate suing Drake, his record label, and numerous other entities for copyright infringement. Estate of James Oscar Smith v. Cash Money Records, Inc., et al., Case No. 14-cv-2703 (S.D.N.Y.).

On its face, this case does not appear to be appropriate for a summary judgment fair use ruling. Yet on May 30, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that Drake’s use of the composition was a transformative fair use. The court’s analysis of the first fair use factor — the purpose and character of the use — was particularly interesting. The court focused on Drake removing material from Smith’s line, “Jazz is the only real music that’s gonna last. All that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow. But jazz was, is and always will be,” so that it read “Only real music is gonna last, all that other bullshit is here today and gone tomorrow.” The court found that the purpose of Drake’s track was “sharply different” from the purpose of Smith’s track. It found that while Smith focused on the primacy of jazz, Drake transformed the song to discuss just “real music” — without any mention of jazz.

This decision will likely be cited frequently by defendants who claim fair use in copyright litigation, as it provides an extremely broad interpretation of  what constitutes a transformative use. Simply put, according to this decision, a small change in lyrics which arguably shifts their meaning can constitute a transformative fair use. This rationale arguably could be applied to other media subject to a copyright claim.

 

 

These materials have been prepared by Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP for general informational purposes only.
They are not legal advice. They are not intended to create, and their receipt by you does not create, an attorney-client relationship.

May 22, 2017

11th Circuit Requires Copyright Registration Certificate in Hand to File Infringement Action, Deepening Circuit Split

Filed under: Copyright — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:13 pm

By Jason Koransky

The Copyright Act sets what seems to be a straightforward threshold for a plaintiff to bring an infringement claim — “preregistration or registration of the copyright claim.” 17 U.S.C. § 411(a). This seemingly simple requirement, however, has led to a significant circuit split on whether “registration” occurs upon merely filing an application with the Copyright Office or when the Copyright Office actually issues a registration certificate. This split only deepened on May 18, 2017, when the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC (Case No. 16-13726) that a plaintiff must have a registration certificate in order to bring a claim.[1]

The Eleventh Circuit detailed the existing circuit split, and sided with the Tenth Circuit to adopt the registration requirement. In contrast, the Ninth and Fifth Circuits have both held a plaintiff needs only to have filed an application for the asserted copyright in order to bring a suit. This approach assumes that the registration itself eventually issues in due course.  The “application” rule was approved by the Eighth Circuit in dicta, while the Seventh Circuit has endorsed — also in dicta — both approaches in separate matters. Further, the First and Second Circuits have discussed this split, yet neither court has expressly endorsed an approach.

Considering the potentially long delays in obtaining a registration after filing an application with the Copyright Office, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Fourth Estate emphasizes that copyright owners should be diligent in filing copyright applications in a timely manner. Otherwise, if the proper venue for an infringement claim is the Eleventh Circuit, a party could be left with no recourse in court while waiting . . . and waiting . . . to obtain a copyright registration.

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[1] The decision is available for download at the court’s website, http://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/201613726.pdf.

These materials have been prepared by Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP for general informational purposes only.
They are not legal advice. They are not intended to create, and their receipt by you does not create, an attorney-client relationship.

January 7, 2016

New Year’s Resolution — Review and Update Website Privacy Policy and Terms of Use

Filed under: Internet, Privacy — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:05 am

Jason Koransky F HRby Jason Koransky, Associate

With the changing of the calendar to 2016, now is a good time to look over your company’s often-neglected website privacy policy and terms of use. Here are 10 areas to focus on in reviewing and updating these important areas of your website.

  1. Disclosure of personal information to third parties. Under California law, California residents can request information about how your company or its subsidiaries provide personally identifiable information (“PII”) to third parties for these third parties’ marketing purposes. Your company’s website should include a notice to California residents that provides them a means to request this information. Further, on January 1, 2016, the Delaware Online Privacy and Protection Act went into effect. One of the provisions in this new law requires a website’s privacy policy to disclose the categories of third parties with which a website operator shares PII about the Delaware-resident users of a website. Accordingly, if your company’s website has any users in Delaware, your company must provide this information in its privacy policy.
  2. Disclose categories of PII collected. To comply with state laws such as those in California and Delaware, as well as to be proactive in communicating privacy issues with visitors to your company’s website, your website privacy policy should disclose all categories of PII that you collect from its users.
  3. Cookies? You should audit the use of cookies on your website, and make sure that your privacy policy properly discloses use of cookies. In addition, you should confirm that the opt-out procedures for cookies are up-to-date and functional.
  4. Limit content geared toward children. The federal Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act generally limits the collection of PII from children under 13. The new Delaware privacy law goes a step further. It prohibits the use, disclosure, or compiling of PII of a child under 18 years old if PII will be used in the marketing or advertising of 17 specific categories of goods and services, such as tobacco, tattoos, tanning facilities, or pornography. If your company’s website is not targeted toward children under 18, the website’s terms of use should expressly state this, and ask anyone under 18 not disclose PII.
  5. Tell users how to access PII. If your company’s website collects PII, the privacy policy should disclose how a user may access, review, and request changes to this PII.
  6. Use easy-to-read, straightforward language. With data security and privacy issues increasingly in the news and of concern to consumers, your website should be proactive in communicating its privacy policy. Making the policy user-friendly is a great place to start. Rather than being in hard-to-decipher legalese, the privacy policy and terms of use should use straightforward language that does not require a lawyer to understand.
  7. Make conspicuous links to the privacy policy and terms of use. The new Delaware privacy law requires that the link to your website privacy policy must be clear and conspicuous.
  8. Remove references to the E.U.–U.S. Safe Harbor Framework. In October 2015, the European Court of Justice declared that the Safe Harbor provision that allowed for the transfer of consumers’ personal information from the E.U. to the U.S. was invalid. Your website’s privacy policy, however, may still have references to this framework, such as stating your company’s compliance with it. Even though a new agreement may be negotiated, with the framework invalidated, references to it should be removed.
  9. Is your DMCA agent contact information correct? If your company’s website qualifies as an Internet Service Provider under the DMCA, it needs to have contact information for the DMCA agent to whom someone would submit a copyright infringement claim notification. You should confirm that this information is accurate.
  10. Are all e-mail, telephone numbers, and mailing addresses correct? Finally, your privacy policy and terms of use should provide website users a way to communicate with you about issues that may exist, either via e-mail, phone, or mail. Confirm that contact information is accurate, that your company actually monitors the e-mail addresses set forth on the site, and responds to inquiries that users may communicate to you.

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Jason Koransky is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, trade secret and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues. Jason’s practice focuses on trademark, trade dress, copyright, data security and privacy, and false advertising litigation domestic and international trademark prosecution and counseling, and privacy issues. He is co-author of the book Band Law for Bands, published by the Chicago-based Lawyers for the Creative Arts.

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March 16, 2015

‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict Creates Unpredictable Music Copyright Landscape

Filed under: Copyright — Tags: , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 3:47 pm

Jason Koransky F HRby Jason Koransky, Associate

The recent verdict that Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams’ hit “Blurred Lines” infringed the copyright to the late Motown legend Marvin Gaye’s composition “Got To Give It Up” has generated significant media attention.[1] And this coverage has certainly been compounded by the eye-popping $7.4 million in damages the California jury awarded Gaye’s heirs.

Controversy and debate have raged about whether the jury was correct, with the primary issue being whether Thicke and Williams actually copied “Got To Give It Up,” or were simply inspired by Gaye’s late-’70s soul/funk composition. Of course, copyright protection does not extend to a musical idea, genre, or overall “feel” of a song. Rather, copyright protects a musical expression fixed in a tangible medium — here, the written composition filed with the U.S. Copyright Office for “Got To Give It Up.” (Gaye’s estate does not own the copyright to the sound recording of “Got To Give It Up,” and thus could not assert that “Blurred Lines” infringed the recording.)

Thicke and Williams made this idea vs. expression dichotomy the primary issue in their complaint for a declaratory judgment of non-infringement: “Being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright infringement. The intent in producing ‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era. In reality, the Gaye defendants are claiming ownership of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work . . . .”

The jury disagreed with this argument. Weighing evidence such as competing expert testimony, recordings of the compositions (interestingly, the judge only allowed the jury to hear a new recording of Gaye’s composition that was made for the litigation and which was based on the music filed with the Copyright Office), and testimony from Thicke and Williams regarding the creation of “Blurred Lines,” the jury found that Thicke and Williams incorporated too many elements of “Got To Give It Up” into “Blurred Lines,” such that it crossed the line from “inspired by” to “copying.”

Does this verdict represent a slippery slope in copyright law, in which songwriters now have grounds to plead infringement when another composition has a similar “feel” but does not actually copy a song? Further, could this decision extend to other media, such as film, literary works, or photography, in which new works are often inspired by those which precede them? (more…)

January 22, 2015

Supreme Court Finds Tacking to Be an Issue of Fact

Filed under: Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 9:17 am

Jason Koransky F HRby Jason Koransky, Associate

The doctrine of “tacking” deals with priority in trademark law. A trademark owner “tacks on” its period of using an earlier version of its mark to the time it has been using the current version of the mark. For tacking to be accepted by the court or the T.T.A.B., however, the respective versions of the marks must be “legal equivalents,” creating “the same, continuing commercial impression.” In a rare opportunity to decide a substantive issue of trademark law, on January 21 the Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion held that tacking is an issue to be decided by a jury. See Hana Financial, Inc. v. Hana Bank, 574 U.S. __ (2015). In affirming the Ninth Circuit’s decision that tacking is an issue of fact, the Court settled a circuit split, with the Federal Circuit and Sixth Circuit having held tacking to be an issue of law.

In this case, the petitioner Hana Financial began using its HANA FINANCIAL mark in commerce in 1995, and in 1996 obtained a federal registration of a logo that included the HANA FINANCIAL mark for financial services. Meanwhile, in 1994, the respondent Hana Bank started to advertise financial services under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club in the United States, targeting Korean expatriates. These advertisements included the name “Hana Bank” in Korean. In 2000, Hana Bank changed its name to Hana World Center, and in 2002 it started operating a bank in the U.S. called Hana Bank.

In 2007, Hana Financial sued Hana Bank for infringing its HANA FINANCIAL mark, and in response Hana Bank claimed priority based on tacking. The case went to trial, at which the jury was given a tacking instruction. The jury found that Hana Bank did not infringe the HANA FINANCIAL mark, and the district court denied Hana Financial’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.

In its brief and straightforward opinion, the Court wrote that tacking was properly in the jury’s hands as an issue of fact because “the tacking inquiry operates from the perspective of an ordinary purchaser or consumer.” It emphasized that it has “long recognized . . . that, when the relevant question is how an ordinary person or community would make an assessment, the jury is generally the decisionmaker that ought to provide the fact-intensive answer.”

The Court acknowledged that courts could decide a tacking issue in a bench trial or on summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law when the facts warrant such a determination. But when the parties request a jury trial, and summary judgment or JMOL is not warranted, tacking must be decided by the jury.

The Court rejected the four arguments Hana Financial made for why tacking is an issue of law. First, even though the “legal equivalents” test in tacking involves the application of a legal standard, the court found no reason why the jury could not properly apply that standard, essentially stating in dicta that the jury could consider this mixed question of law and fact. Next, it rejected Hana Financial’s argument that tacking questions must be decided by comparing the marks at issue to the marks in other tacking cases. Third, it found that juries deciding tacking would not make the trademark system “unpredictable.” Finally, it found that courts have not historically decided the issue of tacking as a matter of law, and that Hana Financial’s cited cases in which the court ruled on tacking included bench trials and summary judgments.

On its facts, Hana holds only that tacking an issue of fact for the jury. But the analysis seems to apply to other issues in trademark law as well, such as likelihood of confusion – even though the opinion does not address these other issues. If Hana is extended to such other issues, it could make it more difficult to obtain summary judgment in trademark litigation.

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Jason Koransky is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, trade secret and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues. Jason’s practice focuses on trademark, trade dress, copyright and false advertising litigation, domestic and international trademark prosecution and counseling, and privacy issues. He is co-author of the book Band Law for Bands, published by the Chicago-based Lawyers for the Creative Arts.

 

 

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January 20, 2015

2015 Resolution: Privacy Compliance

Filed under: Privacy — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 11:05 am

Jason Koransky F HRby Jason Koransky, Associate

“Privacy law” cannot be confined to a small, orderly box. Rather, it is a complicated, sprawling, and sometimes difficult tangle of federal and state laws. From the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and Electronic Communications Privacy Act to state laws addressing use and disclosure of arrest and conviction information, privacy law implicates a broad range of business activities.

Importantly, these laws have major implications for companies that gather, assemble, or otherwise use their customers’ personal identifying information. With so many different types of businesses increasingly focused on creating relationships with their customers by collecting and using personal information, these laws affect a growing number of entities — sometimes in ways that are not readily apparent. Further, data breaches that result in the release of personal information frequently appear in national headlines and often lead to lawsuits.

And privacy law constantly evolves.

For example, proposed federal legislation (the Personal Data Protection and Breach Accountability Act) could potentially create a uniform law addressing requirements to notify consumers in the event of a data breach, which would largely replace the existing patchwork of incongruous state laws. Another piece of proposed federal legislation (the Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act) would create requirements for a business to ensure the maximum possible accuracy of the personal information it collects and provide people a means to access, review, and dispute this information. In addition, President Obama recently discussed federal legislation to protect student data.

On the state level, examples of new laws being implemented include those related to on-line privacy rights of minors, how websites can collect personal identifying information, and information that an employer may ask a potential employee on a job application.

These laws have tangible and far-reaching implications for businesses, which certainly cannot be taken lightly or ignored. Many businesses now have privacy and information-security offices, which monitor compliance and handle issues that arise. Privacy and data security audits, legal risk assessments, and finding solutions for potential red flag privacy issues are essential to minimize the risk of a data breach and minimize the liability from ensuing lawsuits. Solution-based privacy analyses include, for example:

  • Reviewing how a company uses its consumers’ personal identifying information;
  • Reviewing privacy policies associated with websites, apps, and other products or services;
  • Analyzing systems in place to train employees on the use of consumers’ personal identifying information, as well as systems in place to protect this data; and
  • Reviewing actions that have been taken in past data breaches.

While we cannot predict much of what may occur in 2015, we can say with confidence that during this year privacy issues will continue to grow, evolve, and significantly affect businesses in this information age.

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Jason Koransky is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, trade secret and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues. Jason’s practice focuses on trademark, trade dress, copyright and false advertising litigation, domestic and international trademark prosecution and counseling. He is co-author of the book Band Law for Bands, published by the Chicago-based Lawyers for the Creative Arts.

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October 2, 2014

Not Quite “Happy Together” – Recording Industry Scores Significant Victory in First Major Pre-1972 Sound Recordings Performance Rights Decision

Filed under: Copyright, Internet, Litigation — Tags: , , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 9:40 am

by Jason Koransky, Associate

When Sirius XM broadcasts “Happy Together,” “It Ain’t Me Babe,” and other hit recordings from The Turtles through its satellite and Internet radio services, it infringes the copyrights to these recordings, according to a court in the Central District of California.

In an order issued September 22, 2014, in Flo & Eddie Inc. v. Sirius XM Inc., 2:13-cv-05693 (C.D. California: Public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings protected by California copyright law)[1], the record industry scored a significant victory in the first major court ruling on the issue of state copyright protection for public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings. The court granted Flo & Eddie summary judgment on its claim that Sirius’ unlicensed public performances of its sound recordings violated California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), the section in California’s copyright statute that applies to pre-1972 sound recordings. Flo & Eddie is the corporation owned and operated by Howard Kaylan and Mark Volman, founding members and the lead singer and guitarist, respectively, of the 1960s pop group The Turtles. Because the case involves only California state law, however, the court’s ruling is limited in scope to public performances of these recordings in the state of California.

This case is one of a series of lawsuits that seek royalties for public performances by new media music services such as Sirius XM and Pandora of sound recordings created before February 15, 1972, based on the argument that state law protects these recordings from such unlicensed uses. While music compositions have long enjoyed copyright protection under U.S. copyright law, only in 1972 did Congress extend copyright protection to sound recordings. Individual states, however, had enacted their own copyright statutes, which co-existed with the federal Copyright Act until the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Revision Act, which preempted these state laws. The 1976 federal law, however, expressly carved out a preemption exemption to sound recordings created before February 15, 1972. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c) (“With respect to sound recordings fixed before February 15, 1972, any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State shall not be annulled or limited by this title until February 15, 2067.”)

In 1995, Congress expanded the rights attached to a sound recording when it passed the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act, which added digital audio transmissions of sound recordings to the exclusive bundle of rights a copyright grants. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6). SoundExchange has emerged as the performance rights organization that collects the compulsory license fees that non-interactive digital music services—including Sirius XM—pay to perform these recordings.

But Sirius did not pay, and SoundExchange did not attempt to collect, royalties for pre-1972 recordings, as these do not have federal copyright protection. The digital public performance rights that owners of these sound recordings possess have existed in a sort of legal limbo based on the interpretations of state copyright statutes. Flo & Eddie owns the rights to The Turtles’ recordings, and tested these legal waters by suing Sirius for violating California copyright law—and bringing claims for unfair competition, conversion, and misappropriation—for broadcasting its sound recordings.

The case boiled down to statutory construction. The applicable statute, California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), reads (with emphasis added):

The author of an original work of authorship consisting of a sound recording initially fixed prior to February 15, 1972, has an exclusive ownership therein until February 15, 2047, as against all persons except one who independently makes or duplicates another sound recording that does not directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in such prior recording, but consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or simulate the sounds contained in the prior sound recording.

Flo & Eddie argued that “exclusive ownership” of sound recordings encompasses the right to control public performances of these recordings. Sirius argued that because the statute did not expressly specify the public performance right, it was not included in the “exclusive ownership” of a recording. Based on the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and two court decisions which implied that the California statute granted the owner of a sound recording the exclusive right to control public performances of its recordings, the court agreed with Flo & Eddie’s interpretation. As such, because no dispute existed that Sirius had broadcast The Turtles’ recordings without a license, the court granted Flo & Eddie’s summary judgment motion that these public performances infringed their sound recording copyrights. The court also granted Flo & Eddie summary judgment on its unfair competition, conversion, and misappropriation claims.

This case has the potential to create significant revenue streams for major record labels and other owners of pre-1972 sound recordings. Conversely, it presents new licensing and business challenges to Internet, satellite, and other new media non-interactive music service providers. Of course, a treasure trove of artistically and commercially successful music was recorded before 1972—think Elvis, The Beatles, Jimi Hendrix, Miles Davis, Duke Ellington … the list could go on and on. A huge void would exist if Sirius simply stopped broadcasting these recordings. As such, the full implications of the decision in the Flo & Eddie case may take years to emerge, especially considering that the decision applies only in California. For example, a court interpreting another state’s law could issue an opposite decision. But in practicality, Sirius could most likely not block its broadcasts from California. So if this decision is affirmed on appeal, new licensing requirements will likely emerge for digital public performances of pre-1972 sound recordings.

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Jason Koransky is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, trade secret and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues. Jason’s practice focuses on trademark, trade dress, copyright and false advertising litigation, as well as domestic and international trademark prosecution and counseling. He is co-author of the book Band Law for Bands, published by the Chicago-based Lawyers for the Creative Arts.

[1] http://www.soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Flo-Eddie-v.-Sirius-XM-Order-on-MSJ.pdf

 

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