Pattishall IP Blog

June 26, 2014

Aereo’s Internet-Based Television Streaming Services May Be Wizardry, But the Supreme Court is in No Mood for Magic

Filed under: Copyright, Internet, Litigation — Tags: , , , , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:17 pm

Ekhoff_Jessica_2 F LRby Jessica Ekhoff, Associate

Describing its Internet-based television streaming services, tech start-up Aereo proclaims, “It’s not magic. It’s wizardry.”[1] In yesterday’s 6-3 decision the Supreme Court disagreed, or at the very least, adopted a staunchly anti-wizardry stance.[2]

Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., characterized the issue before the Court as whether “Aereo, Inc., infringes this exclusive right [of public performance under §106(4) of the Copyright Act] by selling its subscribers a technologically complex service that allows them to watch television programs over the Internet at about the same time as the programs are broadcast over air.”[3] Despite Aereo’s self-description as a mere equipment supplier doing no “performing” of its own, the Court held in the affirmative.

The Court analyzed the issue in two parts: whether Aereo “performed” under the Copyright Act, and if so, whether the performance was “public.”

In concluding that Aereo did, in fact, perform under the Copyright Act, the majority of the Court turned to the 1976 amendments to the Act, which were adopted, in large part, to bring community antenna television, or CATV—the precursor to cable television—within the scope of the Act. CATV functioned by placing antennas on hills above cities, then using coaxial cables to carry the television signals received by the antennas into subscribers’ homes. CATV did not select which programs to carry, but rather served as a conduit for the transmission and amplification of television signals. Before the 1976 amendments, Supreme Court precedent considered CATV to be a passive equipment supplier that did not “perform” under the Act.[4] After the amendments, to “perform” an audiovisual work such as a television program meant “to show its images in any sequence or to make the sounds accompanying it audible.”[5] CATV thus “performed” the shows it transmitted because it both showed the television programs’ images to its subscribers, and made the accompanying sounds audible. Over a strong dissent authored by Justice Scalia[6], the majority found that, because its services were so similar to those once offered by CATV, Aereo also “performed” under the post-1976 definition of the term.[7]

Having determined that Aereo’s services constitute a performance under the Copyright Act, the Court next turned to the issue of whether those performances are public. Aereo argued its services do not constitute public performance because whenever a subscriber selects a program to watch, Aereo places a unique copy of the show in that subscriber’s folder on Aereo’s hard drive, which no one other than that subscriber can view. If another subscriber wants to watch the same show, she will receive her own copy of the program in her own folder from Aereo. The Court dismissed this argument, finding the “technological difference” inconsequential in light of Congress’s clear intent to bring anything analogous to CATV within the scope of the Copyright Act’s requirements. Under the post-1976 Act, an entity performs a copyrighted work publicly any time it “transmits” a performance. A performance is “transmitted” when it is communicated by any device or process beyond the place from which it is sent, whether the recipients receive the transmission at the same time and place, or at different times and places.[8] Aereo therefore publicly performs a copyrighted television program each time its system sends a copy of that program to a subscriber’s personal Aereo folder.

The majority characterized its holding as a “limited” one, and was careful to emphasize that its decision does not apply to other new technologies, such as cloud-based storage and remote storage DVRs. But with a slew of amici curiae predicting the decision could have a catastrophic impact on the tech industry, there are surely some who will take no comfort from the Court’s assurances. Aereo, unfortunately, may not have a spell to resurrect itself.

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Jessica Ekhoff is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois. Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, trade secret and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues. Jessica’s practice focuses on trademark, trade dress, copyright and false advertising litigation, as well as film clearance, media and entertainment, and brand management.

[1] https://www.aereo.com/about

[2] http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-461_l537.pdf

[3] American Broadcasting Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., No. 13-461, slip op. at 1, 573 U.S. __ (2014).

[4] Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974).

[5] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

[6] Justice Scalia argues that Aereo does not “perform” because it is the subscriber, rather than Aereo, who selects the program she wishes to watch, which in turn activates the individual antennae Aereo has assigned to her for the purpose of viewing that program. This means it is the subscriber who is doing the performing, since she is the one rousing Aereo’s antennae from dormancy and calling up a specific program to watch. Justice Scalia went on to note that although he disagrees with the majority’s interpretation of “perform,” he agrees that Aereo’s activities ought not to be allowed, either because Aereo is secondarily liable for its subscribers’ infringement of the Networks’ performance rights, or because it is directly liable for violating the Networks’ reproduction rights. If future courts fail to find Aereo liable under either of those theories, Justice Scalia advocates relying on Congress to close the loophole. Slip Op. at 12.

[7] Slip Op. at 8.

[8] 17 U.S.C. § 101.

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January 17, 2014

CrossFit Cybersquatter Gets Dealt Multiple Blows

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:52 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

In CrossFit, Inc. v. Results Plus Personal Training Inc, the panel held that an unsubstantiated “consent to transfer” will not avoid an adverse ruling.  National Arbitration Claim Number: FA1305001498576 (June 28, 2013).  The domain names at issue were <crossfitagawam.com>, <crossfitansonia.com>, <crossfitbeaconfalls.com>, and many other “crossfit”-derivative .com domain names referring to different cities across the United States.

CrossFit, Inc. provided workout and gym products and services.  Its revenue mainly came from licensing its registered CROSSFIT marks and programs to affiliate gyms around the country.  Typically the affiliate would register a “crossfit” domain name that included a geographic designator, e.g., crossfitboston.com.  The Respondent, Results Plus Personal Training Inc., was a competitor of Crossfit.  It registered 113 domain names, most of which “do nothing but add the name of a famous or popular city [to] the CrossFit mark.”  Most were used for parked web pages, often with advertising hyperlinks for Respondent and other competitors.  The panel found that Respondent registered that large amount of domain names “to resell them exclusively to Complainant and its affiliates.”  It was a “bad faith endeavor to confuse Internet users into believing Complainant or its CrossFit mark is at the source of the content, all so Respondent can advance its goals to generate revenue.”

Results Plus argued that GoDaddy.com led it to believe that it could legally register and use these domain names in the manner that it did.  Although CrossFit had filed a federal court action seeking $9 million in damages, the Panel determined that it retained authority to proceed to decision.  To avoid an adverse ruling, Results Plus offered to transfer the domain names to Crossfit on the condition that Crossfit pay Results Plus $1,300, which Results Plus argued was “far less” than it had spent maintaining the 113 domain names.

The Panel observed that an effective consent to transfer does not ordinarily arise when the transfer is subject to the condition precedent of a markholder’s payment of fees. The Panel found that Complainant has not implicitly consented in its Complaint to the transfer of the disputed domain names without a decision on the merits by the Panel.  The Panel observed that this “consent-to-transfer” approach was one way cybersquatters tried to avoid adverse holdings, but it normally was ineffective, especially when the alleged “consent” required the transfer of money to the respondent.  The Panel ultimately found that Results Plus did not have any legitimate interest in the disputed domain names and had acted in bad faith, and ordered the domain names transferred to Cross Fit.

This case highlights that trademark owners can bring an action to transfer  multiple infringing domain names from a single cybersquatter under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (commonly referred to as “UDRP”).  The UDRP sets forth the grounds on which arbitrators base their decisions, but there are several different dispute resolution forums from which to choose, all with their own local rules, procedures and leanings.  While I do not practice CrossFit myself, I know a good 1-2 punch when I see one – and, for now, Results Plus is down for the count.

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.

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January 15, 2014

Ninth Circuit Declares GoDaddy Not Contributorily Liable For Cybersquatting

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 1:08 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

In December, the Ninth Circuit held that the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), does not support a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting.  Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2013).[1]

Petrolium Nasional Berhad (Petronas), a major oil and gas company with its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, owns the trademark PETRONAS.  In 2009, Petronas discovered that a third party had registered the domain names “petronastower.net” and “petronastowers.net.”  The third party then used GoDaddy’s domain name forwarding services to forward visitors of the two domain names to a pornographic web site. GoDaddy took no action against the alleged cybersquatting, claiming that (1) it did not host the site; and (2) it was prevented by the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) from participating in trademark disputes regarding domain name ownership.  Id. at 548.

Petronas sued GoDaddy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on a number of theories, including cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and contributory cybersquatting. Following limited discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of GoDaddy. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2012) aff’d, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013).  Petronas appealed only with respect to its claim of contributory cybersquatting.

The Ninth Circuit defined cybersquatting as “registering a domain name associated with a protected trademark either to ransom the domain name to the mark holder or to divert business from the mark holder.” Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550 n. 3 (citing Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.2005)).  Under the ACPA, a person may be civilly liable “if … that person has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark … and registers, traffics in, or uses a [protected] domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). Petronas argued that the ACPA provided for a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting, claiming that “Congress intended to incorporate common law principles of secondary liability into the Act by legislating against the backdrop of the common law of trademark infringement and by placing the ACPA within the Lanham Act.”  Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

Beginning its analysis with the text of the ACPA, the Ninth Circuit noted that the ACPA imposes civil liability for cybersquatting on persons that “register[ ], traffic[ ] in, or use[ ] a domain name” with the “bad faith intent to profit” from that protected mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). The plain language of the statute thus prohibits the act of cybersquatting, but limits when a person can be considered to be a cybersquatter. Id.  Taking notice that the statute makes no express provision for secondary liability, the Ninth Circuit held that “[e]xtending liability to registrars or other third parties who are not cybersquatters, but whose actions may have the effect of aiding such cybersquatting, would expand the range of conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent to profit.” Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550-51.

Petronas then argued that Congress incorporated the common law of trademark, including contributory infringement, into the ACPA, citing a number of district courts decisions that relied on that reasoning in finding a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting. See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1176–79 (C.D.Cal.2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. 10–0653, 2011 WL 108954, at *1–3 (W.D.Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1111–12 (C.D.Cal.2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 635, 646–47 (E.D.Mich.2001).[2]  Again, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded, holding that the “circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ACPA [. . . ] do not support the inference that Congress intended to incorporate theories of secondary liability into that Act.”  Distinguishing between the Lanham Act’s codification of unfair competition and common law trademark infringement and the ACPA, the Ninth Circuit stated that claims under traditional trademark law and the ACPA have distinct elements. Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552  (for example, under the ACPA a mark holder must prove “bad faith,” which is not a requirement under traditional trademark infringement claims, and cybersquatting liability, unlike traditional trademark infringement, does not require commercial use of a domain name).[3]  As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit held that the ACPA simply created a new statutory cause of action to address the new cybersquatting problem and that imposing secondary liability on domain name registrars would unnecessarily expand the scope of the ACPA.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision was not surprising.  The purpose of the ACPA and the UDRP is to provide trademark owners with a remedy against those actively using their trademarks in “bad faith.”  As a domain name forwarding provider, GoDaddy simply did not meet the explicit definition of a “cybersquatter.”  Consequently, trademark owners must use the tools the ACPA and the UDRP provide to go after those the ACPA defines as liable, that is, the cybersquatters themselves.[4]

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.


[2] The Ninth Circuit commented that some of these district courts that recognized a cause of action for contributory liability required that a plaintiff show “exceptional circumstances” in order to hold a registrar liable under that theory. See Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d at 1178; Shah, 2011 WL 108954, at *2; Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d at 647. The Ninth Circuit noted that the “exceptional circumstances” test has no basis in either the Act, or in the common law of trademark. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2013).  Rather than attempt to cabin a judicially discovered cause of action for contributory cybersquatting with a limitation created out of whole cloth, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to recognize such a cause of action in the first place.  Id.

[3] As a practical point, the Ninth Circuit noted that GoDaddy, a registrar holding over 50 million domain names, would have to presumably analyze its customer’s subjective intent with respect to each domain name, using the nine factor statutory test outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).  Moreover, domain name service providers would then be forced to inject themselves into trademark and domain name disputes. which is contrary to the purpose of the ACPA and the UDRP. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549-54 (9th Cir. 2013).

[4] UDRP proceedings are a cost-effective means to protect your trademark online and to keep third parties from diverting people from your legitimate websites and siphoning off ad revenue.

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January 10, 2014

Kanye West Sends Cease and Desist Letter to Stop New COINYE WEST Virtual Currency

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:01 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

Whether you are in the Yeezus camp or the My Beautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy camp, or even if either of those references mean nothing to you, you might still be interested to know that a new currency is in development – in a few days we will all be able to own some COINYE WEST.  Or will we?

As the Wall Street Journal first reported, Kanye West has tried to stop seven anonymous coders behind a new virtual currency called COINYE WEST, similar to bitcoin.  Not surprisingly, Kanye West, by and through his attorneys, has claimed trademark infringement, unfair competition, cyberpiracy and dilution.  You can read the cease and desist letter here.  While the company has changed its domain name from coinyewest.com to coinyeco.in, the coders launched their site on January 7.

West has built a music empire on his KANYE WEST brand, a brand that, according to West’s interview with BBC Radio 1, is the most influential in the world.  As if being the “number one rock star on the planet” was not enough, West’s “I am a God” statement truly makes him a being to reckon with.

While West might be a bit high and mighty (pun intended), he does understand the importance of protecting his brand.  This situation highlights the cross section between trademark rights and the new and evolving internet frontier.  First it was domain names, then came AdWords, and now crypto currency.  While COINYE WEST might face an uphill battle if the case proceeds to court, similar disputes are certain to arise as new technologies develop.  At Pattishall, we strive to stay on the forefront of emerging technologies.  And, while I may not be in the market for any COINYE in the near future, I will be ready to purchase some KARDASH-CASH if Kim Kardashian ever makes any available.[1]

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.


[1] KARDASH-CASH is not a real trademark, nor is it a real currency.  I just made it up for fun.

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October 1, 2012

ICANN Seeks Comments On The Procedures To Be Used by the Trademark Clearinghouse In Connection With The Implementation of New gTLDs

Filed under: International, Internet — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 4:31 pm

by Phillip Barengolts, Partner

On September 24, 2012, ICANN requested comments on two important procedures in the implementation of the Trademark Clearinghouse[1] – proof of trademark use and determination of a match. http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/announcement-7-24sep12-en.htm.  The Trademark Clearinghouse will serve as a repository used by trademark owners to protect against the use of their marks for domain names in any of the new gTLDs during the sunrise period of a new gTLD and for trademark claims generally.[2]  See prior coverage here: https://blog.pattishall.com/2011/11/08/trademark-protection-in-icann%E2%80%99s-new-generic-top-level-domain-%E2%80%9Cgtld%E2%80%9D-space-will-require-diligence-by-trademark-owners/.  The deadline to submit comments is November 7, 2012.

The specific procedures for which ICANN seeks comment now are: 1) the procedures that the Trademark Clearinghouse will use to verify that a claimed trademark is in use; and 2) the process by which the Trademark Clearinghouse will determine a match between a trademark recorded with the Trademark Clearinghouse and an applied-for domain name.  Highlights of these memoranda are below.

Proof of Use

ICANN has decided that only marks that are in use will be provided protection through the Trademark Clearinghouse during the sunrise period of a new gTLD.[3]  Most jurisdictions throughout the world do not require proof of use to obtain a trademark registration, but the U.S. does have such a requirement (with notable exceptions for foreign trademark registration holders).

To prove use, a trademark owner must submit a signed declaration of use and a single sample of current use.  The specific proposed declaration is below:

The [Trademark Holder/Licensee/Agent] hereby certifies that the information submitted to the Clearinghouse, is, to the best of [Trademark Holder/Licensee/Agent’s] knowledge complete and accurate, that the trademarks set forth in this submission are currently in use in the manner set forth in the accompanying specimen, in connection with the class of goods or services specified when this submission was made to the Trademark Clearinghouse; that this information is not being presented for any improper purpose; and that if, at any time, the information contained in this submission is no longer accurate, the [Trademark Holder/Licensee/Agent] will notify the Clearinghouse within a reasonable time of that information which is no longer accurate, and to the extent necessary, provide that additional information necessary for the submission to be accurate. Furthermore, if any Clearinghouse-verified mark subsequently becomes abandoned by the holder, the holder will notify the Clearinghouse within a reasonable time that the mark has been abandoned.

The sample of use must be “an item that evidences an effort on behalf of the trademark holder to communicate to a consumer so that the consumer can distinguish the products or services of one from those of another.”  Examples include:

  • Labels, tags, or containers from a product; and
  • Advertising and marketing materials (including brochures, pamphlets, catalogues, product manuals, displays or signage, press releases, screen shots, or social media marketing materials). (more…)

November 8, 2011

Trademark Protection in ICANN’s New Generic Top-Level Domain (“gTLD”) Space Will Require Diligence by Trademark Owners

Filed under: Internet — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 3:21 pm

Categories: Internet
Tags: ICANN, Internet, Phillip Barengolts, David Beeman

By Phillip Barengolts and David Beeman, Trademark Attorneys[1]

ICANN is launching its new top-level domain (“TLD”) program this winter.  It will begin to accept applications from potential registries on January 12, 2012.  The new TLD program will allow qualified applicants – those able to pay $185,000 (not including infrastructure and other investments to actually run a registry)[2] and meet technical requirements – to establish top-level domain names under any letter and number combination.[3]  While it remains to be seen how many <.company> TLDs will appear given the cost, trademark owners potentially will now face a myriad examples of <infringing_domain_name.whatever> and even some examples of <whatever.infringing_TLD>.  Acknowledging this problem, ICANN announced mechanisms that trademark owners will be able to use to  protect their trademark rights in these new TLDs.  The mechanisms have not been finalized as of this writing, but this post provides a summary of these mechanisms as currently contemplated by ICANN, including a procedure for objecting to the proposed TLDs and protecting owners’ rights in second-level domain names.

Procedure for Objecting to Proposed Top-Level Domain Names

Trademark owners, and others, will be able to object to new TLD applications after ICANN publishes them for public review shortly after the application period closes on April 12, 2012.  ICANN will not be responsible for reviewing the TLD applications for objectionable letter and number combinations.

Four types of objections to new TLDs will be permitted:[4]  1) “existing legal rights,” e.g., ownership of a registered or unregistered trademark; 2)  string confusion (i.e., confusion between two applied-for TLDs); 3) limited public interest objection; and 4) community objection.  We are only discussing the existing legal rights objection.  For information on the other types of objections, see ICANN’s Guidebook.

An existing legal rights objection will have to be filed with the Arbitration and Mediation Center of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).  The rules for this type of objection recently approved by ICANN are available at http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/wipo-rules-clean-19sep11-en.pdf.[5]  The filing fee for a single objection to a single TLD application will be $2,000, and the additional fee for having one panelist hear the objection is $8,000.  For a panel of three, the filing fee will be $3,000, and the panel fee will be $20,000. (more…)

October 26, 2011

Protecting Your Company Brands Against Sexually Explicit and Pornographic .XXX Domain Names – Deadline for Sunrise Period for Blocking Registrations is October 28, 2011

Filed under: Internet, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 9:56 am

Categories: Trademark (General), Internet
Tags: Domain Names, Internet, ICANN, Belinda J. Scrimenti, Jasmine R. Davis

By Belinda J. Scrimenti and Jasmine Davis, Trademark Attorneys

[***Update – . XXX Domain Registry Has Received Over 42,000 Registrations – Deadline
for Sunrise Period for Blocking Registrations is October 28, 2011

ICM Registry, the registry handling .XXX top-level domain (“TLD”) registrations reported this week that it has received over 42,000 applications for .XXX domain names since the September 7, 2011 launch of the Sunrise Period “with thousands more pouring in each day.”  “We are very pleased, but not surprised, by this overwhelming response to the availability of .XXX domains,” said Stuart Lawley, CEO of ICM Registry.  The .XXX domain is intended solely for use by the “adult entertainment” industry.

ICM reported that the number of applications already received is over five times what ICM had anticipated.  ICM also reported that the applications have been “well balanced” between brand owners inside the adult industry and those non-adult brands that want to protect their trademarks.

Trademark owners outside the adult entertainment industry with registered trademarks have only until October 28, 2011 to take advantage of the sunrise period to file for a blocking registration that will prevent use of their trademarks in connection with pornographic uses.  If a trademark owner does not have a registered mark, or misses the deadline, it must wait until December 6, 2011 to file registrations to block others from using their marks in the .XXX domain.  See our August 18, 2011 blog post, below for details on the process.***] (more…)

October 4, 2011

The Ninth Circuit Finds that Re-registering a Domain Name Originally Registered Before a Trademark Owner Acquires Rights Does Not Constitute a Violation of the Anticybersquatting Protection Act

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Internet — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 11:55 am

Categories:  Internet, Cybersquatting
Tags: Internet, ACPA, Cybersquatting,Phillip Barengolts

By Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

In GoPets Ltd. v. Hise, __ F.3d __, Nos. 08-56110, 08-56114 (9th Cir. Sep. 22, 2011),[1] the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity to review the applicability of the Anticybersquatting Protection Act (ACPA) to re-registration of a domain name in connection with the business activities of domainers.[2]  The case serves as a lesson to start-ups, brand owners, domainers, and their attorneys about how to handle disputes over domain names that acquire value because of a use arising after the original registration of the domain name.

Edward Hise registered the domain name <gopets.com> in 1999 with the alleged intent of providing a web portal regarding pets in connection with his cousin’s veterinary business.  Since then he and his brother Joseph decided to become domainers through their corporation Digital Overtures, which registered over 1300 domains during the aughts.

In 2004, GoPets Ltd., a Korean company, created a game called “GoPets” featuring virtual pets and obtained a trademark registration for GOPETS in the U.S. in 2006.  From 2004 – 2005 GoPets attempted to acquire the <gopets.com> domain name from Edward Hise, but he wouldn’t sell for the amounts proposed by GoPets – no more than $1,000.  Digital Overtures re-registered <gopets.com> in 2006.

GoPets then filed a complaint with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).  It lost because the WIPO arbitrator found that the UDRP required the transfer of a domain name only “if the name was initially registered in bad faith.”  This decision resulted in GoPets ultimately offering $40,000 for the domain name.  Not only did the Hises reject this offer, they sent a letter to GoPets threatening., among other things, to use search engine optimization to drive traffic to <gopets.com> and away from GoPets’ official website located at <gopetslive.com>. (more…)

September 20, 2011

Florida Appellate Court Issues New Ruling on Jurisdiction Through Internet Contacts; Questions Zippo

Filed under: Internet, Litigation — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:02 pm

Categories: Litigation, Internet
Tags: Internet, Jurisdiction, Phillip Barengolts

By Phillip Barengolts, Attorney

Frank Caiazzo reviewed a Revolver[1] album cover allegedly signed by all four Beatles and decided that the signatures were a forgery.  This cost the American Royal Arts Corp. (“ARA”) a nearly $15k sale.  ARA sued under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, unfair competition statute, and also claimed defamation.  Caiazzo moved to dismiss all claims for lack of personal jurisdiction, among other reasons.  He lost in the lower court, which found both specific and general jurisdiction over Caiazzo, in part, because of his website.  He appealed.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida affirmed, but only as to specific jurisdiction.[2]  Most significantly for practitioners and businesses assessing the potential to be hailed into court in far away places because of their websites, the Florida court rejected the oft-used Zippo test for determining jurisdiction in connection with a website. [3]

This court, however, found the test flawed and rejected its adoption in Florida.  First, it described the Internet as “essentially a medium for communication and interaction, much like the telephone and the mail.”[4]  It then identified the Zippo test as a “talismanic jurisdictional formula,”[5] which the Supreme Court has forbidden in jurisdictional analysis.  Finally, it quoted favorably a 2004 federal court decision noting that a rigid adherence to Zippo could lead to erroneous results because “even a passive website may support a finding of jurisdiction if the defendant used the website to intentionally harm the plaintiff” and “an interactive… website may not be sufficient to support jurisdiction if it is not aimed at residents in the forum state.”[6]  Furthermore, there must still be a nexus between even the most interactive website and the cause of action alleged.  The court did, however, note that a Zippo analysis could form a part of the overall minimum contacts analysis. (more…)

August 26, 2011

Trademark Protection in the New Generic Top-Level Domain (“gTLD”) Space ICANN Will Unveil on January 12, 2012, Will Require Diligence by Trademark Owners

Filed under: Internet — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:49 pm

Categories: Internet
Tags: ICANN, Internet, Phillip Barengolts, David Beeman

By Phillip Barengolts and David Beeman, Trademark Attorneys

ICANN is launching its new top-level domain (“TLD”) program this winter.  The new TLD program will allow qualified applicants – those able to pay $185,000 (not including infrastructure and other investments to actually run a registry) and meet technical requirements – to establish top-level domain names under any letter and number combination.  While it remains to be seen how many <.company> TLDs will appear given the cost, trademark owners potentially will now face a myriad examples of <infringing_domain_name.whatever> and even some examples of <whatever.infringing_TLD>.  Acknowledging this problem, ICANN announced mechanisms that trademark owners will be able to use to  protect their trademark rights in these new TLDs.  The mechanisms have not been finalized as of this writing, but this post provides a summary of these mechanisms as currently contemplated by ICANN, including a procedure for objecting to the proposed TLDs and protecting owners’ rights in second-level domain names.

Procedure for Objecting to Proposed Top-Level Domain Names

Trademark owners, and others, will be able to object to new TLD applications after ICANN publishes them for public review shortly after the application period closes on April 12, 2012.  ICANN will not be responsible for reviewing the TLD applications for objectionable letter and number combinations. (more…)

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