Pattishall IP Blog

January 17, 2014

CrossFit Cybersquatter Gets Dealt Multiple Blows

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:52 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

In CrossFit, Inc. v. Results Plus Personal Training Inc, the panel held that an unsubstantiated “consent to transfer” will not avoid an adverse ruling.  National Arbitration Claim Number: FA1305001498576 (June 28, 2013).  The domain names at issue were <crossfitagawam.com>, <crossfitansonia.com>, <crossfitbeaconfalls.com>, and many other “crossfit”-derivative .com domain names referring to different cities across the United States.

CrossFit, Inc. provided workout and gym products and services.  Its revenue mainly came from licensing its registered CROSSFIT marks and programs to affiliate gyms around the country.  Typically the affiliate would register a “crossfit” domain name that included a geographic designator, e.g., crossfitboston.com.  The Respondent, Results Plus Personal Training Inc., was a competitor of Crossfit.  It registered 113 domain names, most of which “do nothing but add the name of a famous or popular city [to] the CrossFit mark.”  Most were used for parked web pages, often with advertising hyperlinks for Respondent and other competitors.  The panel found that Respondent registered that large amount of domain names “to resell them exclusively to Complainant and its affiliates.”  It was a “bad faith endeavor to confuse Internet users into believing Complainant or its CrossFit mark is at the source of the content, all so Respondent can advance its goals to generate revenue.”

Results Plus argued that GoDaddy.com led it to believe that it could legally register and use these domain names in the manner that it did.  Although CrossFit had filed a federal court action seeking $9 million in damages, the Panel determined that it retained authority to proceed to decision.  To avoid an adverse ruling, Results Plus offered to transfer the domain names to Crossfit on the condition that Crossfit pay Results Plus $1,300, which Results Plus argued was “far less” than it had spent maintaining the 113 domain names.

The Panel observed that an effective consent to transfer does not ordinarily arise when the transfer is subject to the condition precedent of a markholder’s payment of fees. The Panel found that Complainant has not implicitly consented in its Complaint to the transfer of the disputed domain names without a decision on the merits by the Panel.  The Panel observed that this “consent-to-transfer” approach was one way cybersquatters tried to avoid adverse holdings, but it normally was ineffective, especially when the alleged “consent” required the transfer of money to the respondent.  The Panel ultimately found that Results Plus did not have any legitimate interest in the disputed domain names and had acted in bad faith, and ordered the domain names transferred to Cross Fit.

This case highlights that trademark owners can bring an action to transfer  multiple infringing domain names from a single cybersquatter under the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (commonly referred to as “UDRP”).  The UDRP sets forth the grounds on which arbitrators base their decisions, but there are several different dispute resolution forums from which to choose, all with their own local rules, procedures and leanings.  While I do not practice CrossFit myself, I know a good 1-2 punch when I see one – and, for now, Results Plus is down for the count.

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.

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January 15, 2014

Ninth Circuit Declares GoDaddy Not Contributorily Liable For Cybersquatting

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 1:08 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

In December, the Ninth Circuit held that the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), does not support a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting.  Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 548 (9th Cir. 2013).[1]

Petrolium Nasional Berhad (Petronas), a major oil and gas company with its headquarters in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, owns the trademark PETRONAS.  In 2009, Petronas discovered that a third party had registered the domain names “petronastower.net” and “petronastowers.net.”  The third party then used GoDaddy’s domain name forwarding services to forward visitors of the two domain names to a pornographic web site. GoDaddy took no action against the alleged cybersquatting, claiming that (1) it did not host the site; and (2) it was prevented by the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”) from participating in trademark disputes regarding domain name ownership.  Id. at 548.

Petronas sued GoDaddy in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on a number of theories, including cybersquatting under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and contributory cybersquatting. Following limited discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of GoDaddy. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 2d 856 (N.D. Cal. 2012) aff’d, 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013).  Petronas appealed only with respect to its claim of contributory cybersquatting.

The Ninth Circuit defined cybersquatting as “registering a domain name associated with a protected trademark either to ransom the domain name to the mark holder or to divert business from the mark holder.” Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550 n. 3 (citing Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 680 (9th Cir.2005)).  Under the ACPA, a person may be civilly liable “if … that person has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark … and registers, traffics in, or uses a [protected] domain name.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). Petronas argued that the ACPA provided for a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting, claiming that “Congress intended to incorporate common law principles of secondary liability into the Act by legislating against the backdrop of the common law of trademark infringement and by placing the ACPA within the Lanham Act.”  Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.

Beginning its analysis with the text of the ACPA, the Ninth Circuit noted that the ACPA imposes civil liability for cybersquatting on persons that “register[ ], traffic[ ] in, or use[ ] a domain name” with the “bad faith intent to profit” from that protected mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). The plain language of the statute thus prohibits the act of cybersquatting, but limits when a person can be considered to be a cybersquatter. Id.  Taking notice that the statute makes no express provision for secondary liability, the Ninth Circuit held that “[e]xtending liability to registrars or other third parties who are not cybersquatters, but whose actions may have the effect of aiding such cybersquatting, would expand the range of conduct prohibited by the statute from a bad faith intent to cybersquat on a trademark to the mere maintenance of a domain name by a registrar, with or without a bad faith intent to profit.” Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 550-51.

Petronas then argued that Congress incorporated the common law of trademark, including contributory infringement, into the ACPA, citing a number of district courts decisions that relied on that reasoning in finding a cause of action for contributory cybersquatting. See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d 1173, 1176–79 (C.D.Cal.2011); Microsoft Corp. v. Shah, No. 10–0653, 2011 WL 108954, at *1–3 (W.D.Wash. Jan. 12, 2011); Solid Host, NL v. Namecheap, Inc., 652 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1111–12 (C.D.Cal.2009); Ford Motor Co. v. Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d 635, 646–47 (E.D.Mich.2001).[2]  Again, the Ninth Circuit was not persuaded, holding that the “circumstances surrounding the enactment of the ACPA [. . . ] do not support the inference that Congress intended to incorporate theories of secondary liability into that Act.”  Distinguishing between the Lanham Act’s codification of unfair competition and common law trademark infringement and the ACPA, the Ninth Circuit stated that claims under traditional trademark law and the ACPA have distinct elements. Petroliam, 737 F.3d at 552  (for example, under the ACPA a mark holder must prove “bad faith,” which is not a requirement under traditional trademark infringement claims, and cybersquatting liability, unlike traditional trademark infringement, does not require commercial use of a domain name).[3]  As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit held that the ACPA simply created a new statutory cause of action to address the new cybersquatting problem and that imposing secondary liability on domain name registrars would unnecessarily expand the scope of the ACPA.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision was not surprising.  The purpose of the ACPA and the UDRP is to provide trademark owners with a remedy against those actively using their trademarks in “bad faith.”  As a domain name forwarding provider, GoDaddy simply did not meet the explicit definition of a “cybersquatter.”  Consequently, trademark owners must use the tools the ACPA and the UDRP provide to go after those the ACPA defines as liable, that is, the cybersquatters themselves.[4]

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.


[2] The Ninth Circuit commented that some of these district courts that recognized a cause of action for contributory liability required that a plaintiff show “exceptional circumstances” in order to hold a registrar liable under that theory. See Above.com Pty Ltd., 881 F.Supp.2d at 1178; Shah, 2011 WL 108954, at *2; Greatdomains.com, Inc., 177 F.Supp.2d at 647. The Ninth Circuit noted that the “exceptional circumstances” test has no basis in either the Act, or in the common law of trademark. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 553 (9th Cir. 2013).  Rather than attempt to cabin a judicially discovered cause of action for contributory cybersquatting with a limitation created out of whole cloth, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to recognize such a cause of action in the first place.  Id.

[3] As a practical point, the Ninth Circuit noted that GoDaddy, a registrar holding over 50 million domain names, would have to presumably analyze its customer’s subjective intent with respect to each domain name, using the nine factor statutory test outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B).  Moreover, domain name service providers would then be forced to inject themselves into trademark and domain name disputes. which is contrary to the purpose of the ACPA and the UDRP. Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, Inc., 737 F.3d 546, 549-54 (9th Cir. 2013).

[4] UDRP proceedings are a cost-effective means to protect your trademark online and to keep third parties from diverting people from your legitimate websites and siphoning off ad revenue.

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January 10, 2014

Kanye West Sends Cease and Desist Letter to Stop New COINYE WEST Virtual Currency

Filed under: Cybersquatting, Domain Name, TM Registration — Tags: , , , , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:01 pm

Paul Borovay F LRBy Paul A. Borovay, Associate

Whether you are in the Yeezus camp or the My Beautiful Dark Twisted Fantasy camp, or even if either of those references mean nothing to you, you might still be interested to know that a new currency is in development – in a few days we will all be able to own some COINYE WEST.  Or will we?

As the Wall Street Journal first reported, Kanye West has tried to stop seven anonymous coders behind a new virtual currency called COINYE WEST, similar to bitcoin.  Not surprisingly, Kanye West, by and through his attorneys, has claimed trademark infringement, unfair competition, cyberpiracy and dilution.  You can read the cease and desist letter here.  While the company has changed its domain name from coinyewest.com to coinyeco.in, the coders launched their site on January 7.

West has built a music empire on his KANYE WEST brand, a brand that, according to West’s interview with BBC Radio 1, is the most influential in the world.  As if being the “number one rock star on the planet” was not enough, West’s “I am a God” statement truly makes him a being to reckon with.

While West might be a bit high and mighty (pun intended), he does understand the importance of protecting his brand.  This situation highlights the cross section between trademark rights and the new and evolving internet frontier.  First it was domain names, then came AdWords, and now crypto currency.  While COINYE WEST might face an uphill battle if the case proceeds to court, similar disputes are certain to arise as new technologies develop.  At Pattishall, we strive to stay on the forefront of emerging technologies.  And, while I may not be in the market for any COINYE in the near future, I will be ready to purchase some KARDASH-CASH if Kim Kardashian ever makes any available.[1]

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Paul A. Borovay is an associate with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Paul’s practice focuses on litigation in trademark, media, online gaming and entertainment, advertising, as well as trademark prosecution and counseling.


[1] KARDASH-CASH is not a real trademark, nor is it a real currency.  I just made it up for fun.

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January 31, 2013

Hear This: Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment in Dispute over Headphone Trademarks Between Dolby Labs and Monster, Inc.

Filed under: Licensing, Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:02 pm

JAWby Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger

From a dispute involving trademarks used in connection with headphones, we are reminded how inherently difficult it is to defeat a likelihood-of-confusion claim on summary judgment.

I.   The Parties

Monster, Inc., is a consumer electronics company, which sells a variety of goods to musicians and home-audio enthusiasts in connection with the following registered trademarks:

Monster3

Dolby Laboratories specializes in audio-signal processing.  It licenses its technologies to manufacturers of audio/visual equipment and to content producers, who display Dolby’s trademarks on their products.  Many people may be familiar with the Dolby Double-D symbol from noise-reduction technologies used during the cassette-tape era.  More recently, most people have almost certainly encountered the following trademark on television broadcasts, DVD cases, home-theater equipment, and cinema screens:

Dolby

Both parties either sell headphones or license technology used for headphones.  Monster sells a variety of higher-end headphones, which retail between $100 and $299 per pair.  Dolby developed a headphone technology that purports to deliver 7.1-channel surround sound to a single pair of headphone transducers and licenses this technology to manufacturers who display Dolby’s logo on their products.  Monster and Dolby use the following trademarks, respectively:

Headsets

Dolby’s headphone mark has been registered since 2002.[1]  Monster applied to register its mark in 2008.  After Dolby opposed registration of Monster’s application, Monster filed suit in the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that its headphone trademark did not infringe Dolby’s and that Dolby had abandoned its mark by failing to exercise sufficient control over its licensees.  Dolby counterclaimed for infringement.  Both parties moved for summary judgment. (more…)

March 16, 2012

Bare Trademark Rights? Naked Cowboy’s Infringement Action Against CBS Dismissed

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:11 pm

By Janet Marvel, Trademark Attorney

Robert John Burck has made a career as a New York street performer.  He is (arguably) famous under his alias, “The Naked Cowboy”, appearing with his guitar in Times Square, clad only in a hat, boots and briefs.  In Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 101 USPQ2d 1841 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012), Burck sued CBS for what he believed was a  take-off of his Naked Cowboy character in the CBS television soap opera “The Bold and the Beautiful,” a segment of which CBS later posted on You Tube.  In the soap opera episode, a character appears clad similarly to the Naked Cowboy, namely, with guitar, boots, hat and briefs only.  Burck alleged trademark infringement, state and federal unfair competition, fraud, and violation of New York’s right of privacy statute, New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.  The court dismissed the complaint, holding that while Burck owned trademark rights in “Naked Cowboy,” CBS had not used “Naked Cowboy” in commerce

CBS titled its You Tube clip “The Bold and the Beautiful – Naked Cowboy” and  purchased the You Tube adword “naked cowboy.”  The court held that purchase of adwords was not trademark use because Defendants did not use the term “naked cowboy” in a way that denotes source or sponsorship.  The holding with respect to adword use seems directly contrary to the holding in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), which held that Google’s sale of adwords constituted use in commerce.  Indeed, for support, the Naked Cowboy court cited Merck v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (SDNY 2006), the holding of which Rescuecom cast into doubt.

The court also held that CBS’s use of “Naked Cowboy” in the title of its You Tube clip was not intended (at least on the facts plaintiff pled) to trade on the plaintiff’s goodwill, and therefore that it was “fair use.”  Fair use typically requires a showing that the mark is used nominatively, descriptively, or comparatively.  Reading between the lines, the court must have considered that any performer with boots, briefs and a guitar was an (almost) “naked cowboy,” hence the use was descriptive.

Nor did the court find that the soap opera actor’s costume infringed that of the Naked Cowboy, because Burck plasters “Naked Cowboy” and “Tips” across his articles of clothing, while the actor did not.

Finally, the court rejected the Naked Cowboy’s claim that CBS violated New York’s right of privacy statute, which forbids the “use [] for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade,  the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without prior consent.”  N.Y. Civ. Rights § 50.  The court rejected this argument, citing the Burck’s previous loss in Burck v. Mars, a case in which the Naked Cowboy alleged that a talking M&M candy violated his right of privacy:  “[T]he right of privacy  does not extend to fictitious characters adopted or created by celebrities[,] and it does not protect ‘a trademarked costumed character publicly performed by a person.’”

The case, while probably not doctrinally correct should give hope to naked cowboys everywhere.

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Janet Marvel is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Ms. Marvel’s practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  She co-authored the Fifth Edition of the Trademarks and Unfair Competition Deskbook, recently published by LexisNexis.

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February 28, 2011

Use of a Trademark in Metatags May No Longer Lead to a Nearly Automatic Finding of Trademark Infringement

Filed under: Internet, Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:05 pm

Categories: Internet, Litigation
Tags: Metatags, Federal Litigation, Trademark Infringement, Phillip Barengolts

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Ever since search engines became the primary entry point to the Internet, website operators have been trying to take advantage of search engine algorithms to attract more traffic and raise their placement in search results.  Many of the earliest search engines would read the metatags[1] embedded in a website’s metadata to aid the search engine in determining that website’s responsiveness to a search query.

Thus early courts dealing with allegations of “infringement by metatag” were persuaded that use of the plaintiff’s trademark as a metatag lead easily to a conclusion of trademark infringement.  The most prominent and most often cited case holding this was Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), finding that such use could cause initial interest confusion, i.e., actionable confusion in attracting searchers to a site even if the confusion was subsequently dispelled.  Many courts followed this reasoning. (more…)

December 10, 2010

The Seventh Circuit Clarifies what Constitutes an “Exceptional Case” under the Lanham Act and Calls for Uniformity among the Circuits

Filed under: Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 11:10 am

Categories: Trademark (General)
Tags:  Trademark Infringement, Attorney’s Fees, 7th Circuit, Ashly A. Iacullo

by Ashly Iacullo, Trademark Attorney

The Lanham Act allows prevailing parties to recover an award of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”[1] Cases have been held “exceptional”, for example, where the suit was frivolous, or the infringement in bad faith, or there was misconduct during litigation.

Since its addition to the Lanham Act in 1975, the circuit courts have grappled with what constitutes an “exceptional” case and, accordingly, have set different standards.  In some jurisdictions, the standards for recovery by the plaintiff differ from the standards for recovery by the defendant. (more…)

December 1, 2010

Ninth Circuit Articulates Its Version of the Acquiescence Defense to Trademark Infringement

Filed under: Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 4:13 pm

Categories: Trademark (General)
Tags: Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Infringement, Acquiescence, 9th Circuit

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Acquiescence has long been accepted as a defense to a claim of trademark infringement in most jurisdictions.  The Ninth Circuit recently articulated its definition of the defense in Seller Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Center for Real Estate Education, Inc., No. 08-56791 (9th Cir. 2010).[1]

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that acquiescence “limits a party’s right to bring suit following an affirmative act by word or deed by the party that conveys implied consent to another.”  Accordingly, it held that the elements of an acquiescence defense are: (1) the trademark owner actively represented that it would not assert a right or a claim; (2) the delay between the active representation and assertion of the right or claim was not excusable; and (3) the delay caused the defendant undue prejudice.  Prejudice must involve reliance on the trademark owner’s affirmative act or deed, and the reliance must be reasonable.  The reasonableness of the reliance depends on the content of the affirmative act and the context in which that act was performed.  By contrast, to establish a laches defense in the Ninth Circuit a defendant must, first, establish that the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and, second, that the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. (more…)

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