Pattishall IP Blog

January 31, 2013

Hear This: Court Denies Motion for Summary Judgment in Dispute over Headphone Trademarks Between Dolby Labs and Monster, Inc.

Filed under: Licensing, Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:02 pm

JAWby Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger

From a dispute involving trademarks used in connection with headphones, we are reminded how inherently difficult it is to defeat a likelihood-of-confusion claim on summary judgment.

I.   The Parties

Monster, Inc., is a consumer electronics company, which sells a variety of goods to musicians and home-audio enthusiasts in connection with the following registered trademarks:

Monster3

Dolby Laboratories specializes in audio-signal processing.  It licenses its technologies to manufacturers of audio/visual equipment and to content producers, who display Dolby’s trademarks on their products.  Many people may be familiar with the Dolby Double-D symbol from noise-reduction technologies used during the cassette-tape era.  More recently, most people have almost certainly encountered the following trademark on television broadcasts, DVD cases, home-theater equipment, and cinema screens:

Dolby

Both parties either sell headphones or license technology used for headphones.  Monster sells a variety of higher-end headphones, which retail between $100 and $299 per pair.  Dolby developed a headphone technology that purports to deliver 7.1-channel surround sound to a single pair of headphone transducers and licenses this technology to manufacturers who display Dolby’s logo on their products.  Monster and Dolby use the following trademarks, respectively:

Headsets

Dolby’s headphone mark has been registered since 2002.[1]  Monster applied to register its mark in 2008.  After Dolby opposed registration of Monster’s application, Monster filed suit in the Northern District of California, seeking a declaratory judgment that its headphone trademark did not infringe Dolby’s and that Dolby had abandoned its mark by failing to exercise sufficient control over its licensees.  Dolby counterclaimed for infringement.  Both parties moved for summary judgment. (more…)

March 16, 2012

Bare Trademark Rights? Naked Cowboy’s Infringement Action Against CBS Dismissed

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:11 pm

By Janet Marvel, Trademark Attorney

Robert John Burck has made a career as a New York street performer.  He is (arguably) famous under his alias, “The Naked Cowboy”, appearing with his guitar in Times Square, clad only in a hat, boots and briefs.  In Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 101 USPQ2d 1841 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012), Burck sued CBS for what he believed was a  take-off of his Naked Cowboy character in the CBS television soap opera “The Bold and the Beautiful,” a segment of which CBS later posted on You Tube.  In the soap opera episode, a character appears clad similarly to the Naked Cowboy, namely, with guitar, boots, hat and briefs only.  Burck alleged trademark infringement, state and federal unfair competition, fraud, and violation of New York’s right of privacy statute, New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.  The court dismissed the complaint, holding that while Burck owned trademark rights in “Naked Cowboy,” CBS had not used “Naked Cowboy” in commerce

CBS titled its You Tube clip “The Bold and the Beautiful – Naked Cowboy” and  purchased the You Tube adword “naked cowboy.”  The court held that purchase of adwords was not trademark use because Defendants did not use the term “naked cowboy” in a way that denotes source or sponsorship.  The holding with respect to adword use seems directly contrary to the holding in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), which held that Google’s sale of adwords constituted use in commerce.  Indeed, for support, the Naked Cowboy court cited Merck v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (SDNY 2006), the holding of which Rescuecom cast into doubt.

The court also held that CBS’s use of “Naked Cowboy” in the title of its You Tube clip was not intended (at least on the facts plaintiff pled) to trade on the plaintiff’s goodwill, and therefore that it was “fair use.”  Fair use typically requires a showing that the mark is used nominatively, descriptively, or comparatively.  Reading between the lines, the court must have considered that any performer with boots, briefs and a guitar was an (almost) “naked cowboy,” hence the use was descriptive.

Nor did the court find that the soap opera actor’s costume infringed that of the Naked Cowboy, because Burck plasters “Naked Cowboy” and “Tips” across his articles of clothing, while the actor did not.

Finally, the court rejected the Naked Cowboy’s claim that CBS violated New York’s right of privacy statute, which forbids the “use [] for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade,  the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without prior consent.”  N.Y. Civ. Rights § 50.  The court rejected this argument, citing the Burck’s previous loss in Burck v. Mars, a case in which the Naked Cowboy alleged that a talking M&M candy violated his right of privacy:  “[T]he right of privacy  does not extend to fictitious characters adopted or created by celebrities[,] and it does not protect ‘a trademarked costumed character publicly performed by a person.’”

The case, while probably not doctrinally correct should give hope to naked cowboys everywhere.

*     *     *

Janet Marvel is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Ms. Marvel’s practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  She co-authored the Fifth Edition of the Trademarks and Unfair Competition Deskbook, recently published by LexisNexis.

For a printer-friendly version, click here.

February 28, 2011

Use of a Trademark in Metatags May No Longer Lead to a Nearly Automatic Finding of Trademark Infringement

Filed under: Internet, Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:05 pm

Categories: Internet, Litigation
Tags: Metatags, Federal Litigation, Trademark Infringement, Phillip Barengolts

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Ever since search engines became the primary entry point to the Internet, website operators have been trying to take advantage of search engine algorithms to attract more traffic and raise their placement in search results.  Many of the earliest search engines would read the metatags[1] embedded in a website’s metadata to aid the search engine in determining that website’s responsiveness to a search query.

Thus early courts dealing with allegations of “infringement by metatag” were persuaded that use of the plaintiff’s trademark as a metatag lead easily to a conclusion of trademark infringement.  The most prominent and most often cited case holding this was Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999), finding that such use could cause initial interest confusion, i.e., actionable confusion in attracting searchers to a site even if the confusion was subsequently dispelled.  Many courts followed this reasoning. (more…)

December 10, 2010

The Seventh Circuit Clarifies what Constitutes an “Exceptional Case” under the Lanham Act and Calls for Uniformity among the Circuits

Filed under: Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 11:10 am

Categories: Trademark (General)
Tags:  Trademark Infringement, Attorney’s Fees, 7th Circuit, Ashly A. Iacullo

by Ashly Iacullo, Trademark Attorney

The Lanham Act allows prevailing parties to recover an award of attorneys’ fees in “exceptional cases.”[1] Cases have been held “exceptional”, for example, where the suit was frivolous, or the infringement in bad faith, or there was misconduct during litigation.

Since its addition to the Lanham Act in 1975, the circuit courts have grappled with what constitutes an “exceptional” case and, accordingly, have set different standards.  In some jurisdictions, the standards for recovery by the plaintiff differ from the standards for recovery by the defendant. (more…)

December 1, 2010

Ninth Circuit Articulates Its Version of the Acquiescence Defense to Trademark Infringement

Filed under: Litigation — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 4:13 pm

Categories: Trademark (General)
Tags: Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Infringement, Acquiescence, 9th Circuit

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Acquiescence has long been accepted as a defense to a claim of trademark infringement in most jurisdictions.  The Ninth Circuit recently articulated its definition of the defense in Seller Agency Council, Inc. v. Kennedy Center for Real Estate Education, Inc., No. 08-56791 (9th Cir. 2010).[1]

Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that acquiescence “limits a party’s right to bring suit following an affirmative act by word or deed by the party that conveys implied consent to another.”  Accordingly, it held that the elements of an acquiescence defense are: (1) the trademark owner actively represented that it would not assert a right or a claim; (2) the delay between the active representation and assertion of the right or claim was not excusable; and (3) the delay caused the defendant undue prejudice.  Prejudice must involve reliance on the trademark owner’s affirmative act or deed, and the reliance must be reasonable.  The reasonableness of the reliance depends on the content of the affirmative act and the context in which that act was performed.  By contrast, to establish a laches defense in the Ninth Circuit a defendant must, first, establish that the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit was unreasonable and, second, that the defendant was prejudiced by the delay. (more…)

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