Pattishall IP Blog

November 27, 2012

When it Comes to Parody Twitter Accounts, Laughing Them Off May Be Your Best Move

Filed under: Internet, Social Media, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 12:39 pm

by Andrew R. W. Hughes

The @NYTOnIt Twitter feed managed to draw more than 20,000 followers and accolades from Time magazine with its wry send-ups of New York Times trend pieces.  Whenever the New York Times published a story that Benjamin Kabak found obvious, pompous, or otherwise groan-inducing, he took to his @NYTOnIt Twitter handle to mock the venerable publication.  When the New York Times ran a piece on teenagers’ bedrooms being messy, @NYTOnIt was there with, “GUYS, teenagers have messy bedrooms, and The Times is ON IT.
http://nyti.ms/X62BZs
.”  An article about seniors and the Internet drew, “GUYS, some old people aren’t too up on the Internet, and The Times is ON IT.
http://nyti.ms/SaJglV
.”

While many people found the account hilarious, the New York Times did not.  This week, the paper complained to Twitter, which suspended the account.[1]  The basis of the complaint was apparently not the content, but Kabak’s use of a modified version of the Times’ “T” logo as the handle’s avatar:

As the paper’s spokeswoman Eileen Murphy explained, “We’re not seeking to disable the account however it is important to The Times that our [trademark] is protected and that it is clear to all users of Twitter that parody accounts or other unofficial Times accounts are not affiliated nor endorsed by The Times.”[2]

Kabak claimed that his use of the modified Times logo was fair use.  Bolstering his claim was the fact that the description of the account explicitly stated that it was “a parody account clearly not associated with any newspaper.”[3]  Nonetheless, in accordance with its rules regarding trademark protection, Twitter initially suspended the account, before restoring it without the potentially infringing logo. (more…)

October 10, 2012

Pattishall Client Prevails On Counterfeiting and Infringement Claims Over Marks for Vehicle Braking Systems; Court Awards Over $13 Million in Damages, Attorneys’ Fees, Costs and Sanctions

Filed under: Advertising, Counterfeiting, Litigation, Pattishall, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 3:12 pm

Pattishall client Robert Bosch LLC (“Bosch”) was awarded judgment of over $13 Million by default on its claims of counterfeiting, infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising after nearly three years of litigation and “extensive and cumbersome discovery” in Robert Bosch LLC v. A.B.S. Power Brake, Inc., Case No. 09-14468 (E.D. Mich. August 2, 2012).  Pattishall attorneys Belinda Scrimenti, Bradley Cohn, Thad Chaloemtiarana, and Jeffrey Wakolbinger represented Bosch in this litigation in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan before the Honorable Patrick J. Duggan.

Specifically, Judge Duggan:

  • awarded Bosch $12,875,997.96; consisting of $3,931,220 in defendant’s profits (which the court trebled to $11,793,660), $993,309.00 in reasonable attorneys’ fees, and $89,028.96 in costs;
  • awarded Bosch $142,082.52 as a judgment for previously entered sanctions;
  • enjoined defendants from future use of Bosch’s HYDRO-BOOST and HYDRO-MAX marks in connection with hydraulic vehicle braking systems or remanufactured, reconditioned or rebuilt Bosch products; and
  • ordered the defendants to destroy all infringing products and promotional materials.

The Court’s opinion highlighted the difficulty of assessing actual damages given the actions of the defendants in discovery and found the Pattishall team’s method for estimating damages to be reasonable.  Relying on survey evidence of law firms nationwide, Judge Duggan also found Pattishall’s Chicago-based attorneys’ fees request reasonable and consistent with rates of comparably-situated firms in Detroit with large intellectual property practices under the traditional lodestar analysis.

The defendants’ alleged violations covered a range of activities, including manufacturing of counterfeit products sold under Bosch’s trademarks, use of identical and similar infringing marks on generic products, sale of refurbished Bosch products that failed to meet genuine Bosch specifications, and false advertising of refurbished hydraulic brake products as new, genuine Bosch products.

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July 12, 2012

Seventh Circuit Issues Important Decision Regarding Trademarks in Bankruptcy

Filed under: Licensing, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:46 am

By Janet Marvel, Trademark Attorney

When a trademark licensor declares bankruptcy, the trustee may reject the trademark license.   The trademark licensee then can lose its rights to use the licensed trademark, which obviously can be a disaster for the licensee.  The Bankruptcy Code protects patent and copyright licensees from this fate, but not trademark licensees.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).

On Monday, the Seventh Circuit created a circuit split and issued a very encouraging decision for trademark licensees.  In Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC., 2012 WL 2687939 (7th Cir. July 9, 2012), the Seventh Circuit held that a trademark licensee retained its rights to use a licensed trademark even after the bankruptcy trustee for the licensor rejected the license agreement.

Some background is necessary.  In 1985, the Fourth Circuit decided Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985).  There, the court held that an intellectual property licensee loses its rights to use licensed property if the license is rejected in bankruptcy.  Three years later, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to permit “intellectual property” licensees to continue to use licensed property after rejection, subject to certain conditions. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n).  The Bankruptcy Code’s definition of “intellectual property” includes patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, but not trademarks.

Many courts interpreted the omission of trademarks from the definition of “intellectual property” to mean that the Lubrizol holding continued to apply to trademark licensees, and they would not retain any license rights upon rejection.  This interpretation has been assailed, but never as aggressively as by the Sunbeam Products decision.  See In re Exide Technologies, 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 1470 (2011) (Ambro J., concurring).

Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing for the court in Sunbeam Products, found that Lubrizol “was mistaken”.  In the Sunbeam Products case, the debtor-licensor made box fans, among other things.  It contracted with Chicago American Manufacturing (“CAM”) to manufacture the fans, and granted a patent and trademark license to CAM.  The agreement permitted CAM to itself sell box fans it made for the debtor if the debtor could not afford to buy the fans for resale.  When the debtor went bankrupt, Sunbeam bought its trademarks.  Sunbeam wanted to make fans under the licensed mark without competition from CAM.  The trustee rejected CAM’s license agreement, and Sunbeam sued CAM for infringement.

The district court held for CAM, permitting CAM “on equitable grounds” to continue to use the licensed mark.  The Seventh Circuit rejected “equitable grounds” as the rationale for the decision, but affirmed it anyway.  The court held that the omission of trademarks from section 365(n) was not a codification of Lubrizol.  Instead, the court stated that “an omission is just an omission.”  The court then noted that a rejection under the Bankruptcy Code was a breach of contract, in this case by the licensor, “but nothing about this process implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized.”  Id. at *3.  The rejection ”merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform and has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence.” Id. at *4 (citations and internal quotations omitted). As such, rejection, even if effected, did not terminate the licensee’s rights.

After Sunbeam Products, trademark licensees in the Seventh Circuit now share “the same rights” under the Bankruptcy Code as other intellectual property licensees.  Whether Sunbeam will appeal to the Supreme Court, and then, whether the Court will grant certiorari, remains to be seen.

*     *     *

Janet Marvel is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Ms. Marvel’s practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  She co-authored the Fifth Edition of the Trademarks and Unfair Competition Deskbook, recently published by LexisNexis.

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April 11, 2012

Fourth Circuit Reverses Grant Of Summary Judgment In Rosetta Stone v. Google: Google’s AdWords Program To Be Put On Trial

Filed under: Internet, Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 6:07 pm

by Uli Widmaier, Trademark Attorney

I.   Summary

Rosetta Stone, a leading language-learning software producer, sued Google for trademark infringement and dilution based on Google’s sale of Rosetta Stone’s marks as keywords.  In 2010, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia entered summary judgment against Rosetta Stone’s trademark claims (direct, contributory, and vicarious trademark infringement; dilution), and dismissed Rosetta Stone’s unjust enrichment claim.  See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 and 732 F. Supp. 2d 628 (E.D. Va. 2010).

Rosetta Stone appealed.  On April 9, 2012, the Fourth Circuit issued its long-awaited decision.  See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., — F.3d –, No. 10-2007, 2012 WL 1155143 (4th Cir. April 9, 2012).  The Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment rulings in Google’s favor on Rosetta Stone’s three most important claims – for direct infringement, contributory infringement, and dilution.  The decision is notable for the Court’s frank criticism directed at the district court’s orders, finding substantial flaws in the district court’s analysis of both the factual record and the applicable legal doctrine.  The Fourth Circuit’s analysis contains a number of important assessments of actual confusion evidence, a defendant’s level of knowledge necessary to prove contributory infringement, the possibility of a plaintiff’s proving dilution when recognition of the plaintiff’s mark actually increased during the relevant time period, and several other matters. In light of these determinations, the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of summary judgment on Rosetta Stone’s claims for vicarious infringement and dismissal of Rosetta Stone’s unjust enrichment claim provides scant comfort for Google.

The Fourth Circuit’s decision may well influence the approach to keyword advertising cases under U.S. trademark law.  With this decision, the law would seem to have become more favorable to trademark owners whose marks are being sold and used as keywords.  Search engines may reconsider some of their keyword advertising practices.  Parties who use others’ trademarks as keywords for their own sponsored links may wish to assess whether any of their practices may be affected by the Fourth Circuit’s analysis.  This is particularly true for situations in which the trademarks used as keywords also appear in the text of a sponsored link.  In the meantime (and barring a settlement), the fate of Google’s current keyword advertising model stands to be determined by a jury.

II.   A Circuit Split in the Making?

The Fourth Circuit’s evaluation of the evidence of actual and likely consumer confusion stands in contrast to two recent decisions from the Ninth Circuit, Toyota Motor Sales, USA, Inc., v. Tabari, 610 F.3d. 1171 (9th Cir. 2010) and Network Automation, Inc., v. Advanced System Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit premised these decisions on its finding that consumers have become sophisticated in exploring search engine results, including sponsored links.  According to the Ninth Circuit, consumers understand what sponsored links are, recognize them by their labels and graphic set-offs on search results pages, and are “ready to hit the back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.”  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179; see also Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152.  Moreover, “consumers don’t form any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing page – if then.  This is sensible agnosticism, not consumer confusion.”  Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179.

Contrast this with the Fourth Circuit’s observation in Rosetta Stone that “even well-educated, seasoned Internet consumers are confused by the nature of Google’s sponsored links and are sometimes even unaware that sponsored links are, in actuality, advertisements.  At the summary judgment stage, we cannot say on this record that the consumer sophistication factor favors Google as a matter of law.”  In fact, the Court noted, such uncertainty constitutes “quintessential actual confusion evidence.”  Rosetta Stone at *10.

“Sensible agnosticism” versus “quintessential actual confusion evidence” – these are rather different, and potentially outcome-determinative, evaluations of rather similar states of mind.  It remains to be seen how these two different approaches will play out in the evolution of trademark law as it relates to keywords and sponsored links. (more…)

March 28, 2012

Court Deals Blow to Hasbro in Dispute Involving Transformers Trademark

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:34 am

by Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger, Trademark Attorney

The storyline developed to market the “Transformers” line of toy robots that transform into vehicles and other objects is probably familiar to any child of the ’80s and certainly to anyone who contributed to the box-office success of the 2007 Transformers movie and its sequels.  It’s a battle between Optimus Prime’s virtuous Autobots and Megatron’s evil Decepticons, an epic robot battle between good and evil.

A somewhat less epic battle is being waged in the Central District of California, where Hasbro, the owner of the Transformers brand, has sued Asus Computer International, a manufacturer of high-end electronics, for trademark infringement and dilution.  See Hasbro, Inc. v. Asus Computer Int’l, Inc., No. 11-cv-10437 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2012).[1]

Hasbro owns a registration for TRANSFORMERS in class 28 for “toy action figures, toy vehicles, and toy robots convertible into other visual forms.”  Taking advantage of renewed interest in the Transformers brand (owing to the success of the recent film franchise), Hasbro launched the Emmy-nominated “Transformers Prime” animated television series in November 2010 and applied to register its TRANSFORMERS PRIME mark in classes 28 and 41.

On January 4, 2011, Asus announced the launch of its Eee Pad Transformer tablet computer, which uses Google’s Android operating system and is capable of “transforming” from a tablet computer into a laptop when connected to a mobile docking station.  The name did not go unnoticed by Hasbro, which sent Asus a cease-and-desist letter two weeks after the announcement.  Asus’s counsel responded, asserting that Hasbro’s mark did not apply to netbook computers and that Asus’s use of the term was merely descriptive.  No further communications between the parties were exchanged, and Asus began selling the Eee Pad Transformer tablet in April 2011.  On October 19, 2011, Asus announced the second generation of its tablet: the Eee Pad Transformer Prime.  According to Asus, the word “prime” was added to signify the premium nature of the product and “to emphasize the tablet was first in time, rank, authority, and significance.”  It’s also the last name of the Autobots’ protagonist.  Hasbro filed suit on December 16, 2011, and moved for a preliminary injunction shortly thereafter.

The district court denied Hasbro’s motion on March 23, 2012.  The court found that Hasbro failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims, explaining, among other things, that Hasbro’s computer-related products, including Transformers-themed USB storage devices, speakers, laptop skins, and a toy “educational laptop,” were “gimmicky,” while Asus’s “sleek” products were anything but.  The court held that this and other equitable considerations weighed against granting the “extraordinary and drastic remedy of preliminary relief.”

The court accepted Asus’s uncontroverted evidence that it would suffer considerable hardship from the recall of goods already in circulation—particularly in light of the very short window of opportunity for computer manufacturers to capitalize on the latest technology—and rejected Hasbro’s claims of hardship in light of the fact that Hasbro waited eleven months after sending a cease-and-desist letter and eight months after Asus launched its original Eee Pad Transformer tablet before filing suit.  Although it may have been the announcement of Asus’s Eee Pad Transformer Prime tablet that ultimately pushed Hasbro into filing, Hasbro still waited two months before filing its complaint on the eve of Asus’s second-generation tablet’s launch.

One could argue that the court’s focus should have been on the time between the announcement of Asus’s second-generation Eee Pad Transformer Prime tablet and Hasbro’s filing, but this is hardly the first case in which a court has resisted a party’s claimed need of immediate injunctive relief in light of a perceived delay in bringing the matter before the court.  Although the denial of a motion for preliminary injunction is not a total defeat, it is often more than meets the eye.  A party making such a motion risks prematurely committing to legal theories and factual positions, losing goodwill with the court, and losing bargaining power with the defendant.  Hasbro’s ultimate likelihood of success remains to be seen, but the outcome of this dispute may easily be influenced by this early decision.  Trademark owners and their counsel must carefully evaluate the strength of their claims and consider appropriate equitable concerns before seeking the “extraordinary and drastic remedy of preliminary relief.”

*          *          *

Jeffrey A. Wakolbinger is an attorney with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.   Jeff’s practice focuses on trademark and copyright litigation, as well as domestic and international trademark, Internet, e‑commerce, and copyright law.

March 27, 2012

Fourth Circuit Overturns Laches Defense Victory for Clear Channel

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:17 am

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Trademark owners have a duty to police their rights or risk erosion or even loss of those rights.  This duty does not extend to every known infringement, but alleged infringers often assert unaddressed third-party use of other infringing marks as a means of defeating a trademark infringement claim against them.  Thus, a trademark owner should engage in a consistent level of policing to protect its investment in its brand.

As with most types of tort claims, waiting to file suit against a particular infringer carries the risk that the equitable doctrine of laches will bar the suit.  In most jurisdictions laches, may bar monetary relief for trademark infringement, but rarely precludes injunctive relief.  The Fourth Circuit’s recent decision in Ray Commn’s, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commn’s, Inc., No. 11-1050 (4th Cir. Mar. 8, 2012),[1] highlights the difficulty of prevailing on a laches defense and provides guidance for plaintiffs overcoming a laches problem in a suit.

The dispute concerned the trademark AGRINET, used for competing agricultural news radio programs.  Both parties used the mark for many years, but it was undisputed that Ray Communications (“RCI”) was the prior user in all geographic areas.  The relevant issue for laches was whether RCI delayed so long as to bar its trademark infringement claim as a matter of law.  The district court said yes, granting Clear Channel summary judgment on RCI’s trademark infringement claim.  The Fourth Circuit reversed, finding the district court abused its discretion.

The main points raised by the Fourth Circuit in vacating the district court’s decision were:

1.      Although RCI knew of Clear Channel’s uses of AGRINET in certain regions of the country for over 25 years, because it did not use the AGRINET mark in those regions, its trademark infringement claim had not yet accrued;

2.      There was a genuine dispute as to RCI’s grant of licenses to some of Clear Channel’s predecessors-in-interest (even though RCI had trouble producing those licenses in discovery); and

3.      Evidence that Clear Channel had stopped using AGRINET in some jurisdictions to facilitate settlement suggested that Clear Channel would not suffer any economic injury from changing its mark.

The key teachings of this decision are that laches does not start to run until the trademark owner is aware of the infringement, as distinct from mere knowledge of the use.  Keeping a record of all trademark licenses, and other grants of permission, helps protect trademark owners in future suits.  Finally, at least in the Fourth Circuit, to bar injunctive relief, a defendant must meet a higher standard than the traditional factors of 1) knowledge, 2) unreasonable delay, and 3) undue prejudice to the defendant.

 * * *

Phillip Barengolts is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Mr. Barengolts’ practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  He teaches trademark and copyright litigation at John Marshall Law School, and co-authored Trademark and Copyright Litigation, published by Oxford University Press.

March 16, 2012

Bare Trademark Rights? Naked Cowboy’s Infringement Action Against CBS Dismissed

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 2:11 pm

By Janet Marvel, Trademark Attorney

Robert John Burck has made a career as a New York street performer.  He is (arguably) famous under his alias, “The Naked Cowboy”, appearing with his guitar in Times Square, clad only in a hat, boots and briefs.  In Naked Cowboy v. CBS, 101 USPQ2d 1841 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2012), Burck sued CBS for what he believed was a  take-off of his Naked Cowboy character in the CBS television soap opera “The Bold and the Beautiful,” a segment of which CBS later posted on You Tube.  In the soap opera episode, a character appears clad similarly to the Naked Cowboy, namely, with guitar, boots, hat and briefs only.  Burck alleged trademark infringement, state and federal unfair competition, fraud, and violation of New York’s right of privacy statute, New York Civil Rights Law §§ 50, 51.  The court dismissed the complaint, holding that while Burck owned trademark rights in “Naked Cowboy,” CBS had not used “Naked Cowboy” in commerce

CBS titled its You Tube clip “The Bold and the Beautiful – Naked Cowboy” and  purchased the You Tube adword “naked cowboy.”  The court held that purchase of adwords was not trademark use because Defendants did not use the term “naked cowboy” in a way that denotes source or sponsorship.  The holding with respect to adword use seems directly contrary to the holding in Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009), which held that Google’s sale of adwords constituted use in commerce.  Indeed, for support, the Naked Cowboy court cited Merck v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 415 (SDNY 2006), the holding of which Rescuecom cast into doubt.

The court also held that CBS’s use of “Naked Cowboy” in the title of its You Tube clip was not intended (at least on the facts plaintiff pled) to trade on the plaintiff’s goodwill, and therefore that it was “fair use.”  Fair use typically requires a showing that the mark is used nominatively, descriptively, or comparatively.  Reading between the lines, the court must have considered that any performer with boots, briefs and a guitar was an (almost) “naked cowboy,” hence the use was descriptive.

Nor did the court find that the soap opera actor’s costume infringed that of the Naked Cowboy, because Burck plasters “Naked Cowboy” and “Tips” across his articles of clothing, while the actor did not.

Finally, the court rejected the Naked Cowboy’s claim that CBS violated New York’s right of privacy statute, which forbids the “use [] for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade,  the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without prior consent.”  N.Y. Civ. Rights § 50.  The court rejected this argument, citing the Burck’s previous loss in Burck v. Mars, a case in which the Naked Cowboy alleged that a talking M&M candy violated his right of privacy:  “[T]he right of privacy  does not extend to fictitious characters adopted or created by celebrities[,] and it does not protect ‘a trademarked costumed character publicly performed by a person.’”

The case, while probably not doctrinally correct should give hope to naked cowboys everywhere.

*     *     *

Janet Marvel is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Ms. Marvel’s practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  She co-authored the Fifth Edition of the Trademarks and Unfair Competition Deskbook, recently published by LexisNexis.

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March 14, 2012

Sky Diving for Dollars: Ninth Circuit Upholds Jury’s $6 Million Award to Skydive Arizona for Defendants’ Trademark Infringement, False Advertising, and Cybersquatting

Filed under: Advertising, Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 11:12 am

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Skydive Arizona sued a group of defendants, collectively called “Skyride” by the court, for trademark infringement, false advertising, and cybersquatting.  At trial, the jury awarded Skydive Arizona $1 million in actual damages for false advertising, $2.5 million in actual damages for trademark infringement, $2,500,004 in defendant’s profits from the trademark infringement, and $600,000 for statutory cybersquatting damages.  The district court, upon its own initiative, then doubled the two actual damages awards, for a total of $10.1 million.  Finally, the district court enjoined Skyride from operating in Arizona.  Skyride appealed and, except for the doubling of actual damages, lost.[1]  See Skydive Arizona, Inc. v. Quattrocchi, No. 10-16099 (March 12, 2012), available here:
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2012/03/12/10-16099.pdf
.

Trademark and false advertising litigation is different from other commercial litigation in many respects, but what the Ninth Circuit opinion highlights is the difference in precision required to support monetary damages.  Skyride’s appeal focused on the lack of evidentiary support for the jury award.  Specifically, Skyride argued that the district court abused its discretion by:

(1) upholding the jury’s actual damages award, because Skydive Arizona did not present sufficient evidence concerning the amount of damages; (2) upholding the jury’s lost profits award, because the jury failed to deduct SKYRIDE’s expenses and costs based on the “clearly erroneous” testimony of Skydive Arizona’s expert; (3) enhancing the jury’s damages award to punish SKYRIDE; and (4) upholding and enhancing the entire actual damages, lost profits, and statutory damages award, because the judgment was grossly excessive.

Other than (3), the Ninth Circuit found these arguments unpersuasive.

Under the Lanham Act, a court may award the following in its discretion: (1) defendant’s profits; (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff; and (3) the costs of the action.  15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  “In assessing profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only.”  Id.  A mark holder is held to a lower standard in proving the exact amount of actual damages.  See La Quinta Corp., 603 F.3d 327, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).  Plaintiff’s damages are measured in the same manner as in tort cases: “the reasonably foreseeable harms caused by the wrong.”  A jury award may be supported by “crude” measures “based upon reasonable inferences.”  See Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 621 (9th Cir. 1993).

The jury had only the following evidence to support the actual damages award: three exhibits showing Skydive Arizona’s advertising expenditure for the years 1997-2007, declarations and witness testimony blaming Skydive Arizona for problems caused by Skyride’s acts, and counsel’s request that the jury consider Skydive Arizona’s need to engage in corrective advertising.

To establish Skyride’s profits, Skydive Arizona presented an expert who calculated Skyride’s revenues by:

calculating the number of Arizona residents identified in SKYRIDE’s records and then increasing that number by 2.131 to account for files missing residence information.  He then multiplied that number by an average transaction amount, and then adjusted for resulting revenue from out-of-state residents who also jumped in Arizona.  Lastly, [he] added an interest factor of 10%, using the prejudgment interest rate applicable under Arizona law.

Skyride argued after trial and on appeal that this expert testimony was clearly erroneous because “he did not properly deduct vendor payments or overhead costs, and he applied an improper interest rate.”  The Ninth Circuit stressed that Skyride did not challenge the admissibility of this expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 through a Daubert challenge at any point during the trial and, therefore, upheld the award of profits.  Of course, both courts could also have pointed out that, under the Lanham Act, the burden of deducting vendor payments and overhead was Skyride’s and not Skydive Arizona’s.

Skyride finally won a point on appeal by successfully arguing that the district court doubled the damages awards to punish Skyride.  Lanham Act damages must be compensatory and cannot be punitive. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).  The district court’s commentary surrounding the doubling conveyed its distaste for Skyride’s “purposefully deceitful” conduct and need for Skyride to “accept the wrongfulness of [its] conduct.”

Skyride’s last argument was that the overall award of $10 million at trial was grossly excessive and punitive for a company with “only $23 million” in nationwide gross revenues.  The Ninth Circuit easily dismissed this contention that, essentially, Skyride was “too small to justify such a large award.”

So, here is what you need to support a $6 million damages award in a trademark and false advertising case: an unsympathetic defendant, proof of your advertising expenditures, proof of defendant’s revenues, and evidence suggesting the need for corrective advertising.  Your results may vary.

*       *      *

 Phillip Barengolts is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Mr. Barengolts’ practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  He teaches trademark and copyright litigation at John Marshall Law School, and co-authored Trademark and Copyright Litigation, published by Oxford University Press.

[1] Skydive Arizona appealed the geographic scope of the injunction as being too narrow and lost, but we won’t address that here.  For further background on this case and the facts at issue, see
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/05/geographic_trad.htm
.

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January 5, 2012

Using An Employee’s Personal Social Media Accounts Without Her Authorization To Market Employer May Create Liability Under Trademark And Electronic Privacy Laws

Filed under: Advertising, Litigation, Right of Publicity, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:55 am

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

We’ve all been taught that our work e-mail and social media accounts are owned by our employers, so watch what you say and realize that you have no expectation of privacy in those accounts.  But what happens when an employee uses a personal account to promote her employer?  According to one court, the employer’s use of these accounts without the employee’s authorization can lead to liability under the Lanham Act and the Stored Communications Act. Maremont v. Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd., Case No. 10 C 7811 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2011).[1]

The plaintiff, Jill Maremont, was the Director of Marketing, Public Relations, and E-commerce for the defendant Susan Fredman Design Group, Ltd. (SFDG), a prominent interior design firm based in Chicago.  As part of a social media marketing campaign for SFDG, Maremont created a blog on SFDG’s website.  She also promoted SFDG through her personal Twitter and Facebook accounts., including by linking to the SFDG website and blog.  She entered and stored all account access information, including passwords for her personal Twitter and Facebook accounts, on the SFDG server.  She never gave authority to anyone to access her personal Twitter and Facebook accounts. Maremont’s compensation was, in part, based on the overall sales of SFDG, so she had every incentive to promote SFDG.

After suffering a serious accident, Maremont could not work for some time and SFDG decided to continue posting to Maremont’s personal accounts to promote SFDG.  Once she found out, Maremont asked SFDG to stop – but SFDG did not.  After some back and forth about Maremont returning to work for SFDG, she went to another company and sued SFDG over the use of her social media accounts.  (more…)

November 17, 2011

Alibaba.Com Found Subject To General Personal Jurisdiction In Missouri – And Possibly In Any State

Filed under: Litigation, Trademark (General) — Tags: , , — Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP @ 10:38 am

Categories: Trademark (General), Litigation
Tags: Trademark, Personal Jurisdiction, Phillip Barengolts

by Phillip Barengolts, Trademark Attorney

Cepia makes ZhuZhu Pets.[1]  For purposes of our discussion here, Alibaba’s primary business is <alibaba.com>, an Internet website that facilitates international business-to-business transactions.  Cepia sued Alibaba Group Holdings Limited and Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Limited for trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, false advertising, false designation of origin, copyright infringement, unfair competition, and dilution over Alibaba’s facilitation of the sale of counterfeit and unauthorized ZhuZhu Pets merchandise by hosting a link on <alibaba.com> that directed users to a ZhuZhu Pets microsite featuring ZhuZhu Pets products for sale from various sellers of such merchandise.  Both Alibaba entities moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.  The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri held that Alibaba Group Holdings Limited was not subject to jurisdiction in St. Louis, while Alibaba.Com Hong Kong Limited was.  Cepia LLC v. Alibaba Group Holdings Ltd., No. 4:11–CV–273, 2011 WL 5374747 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 8, 2011).[2]

We are going to assume reader familiarity with the general standards governing personal jurisdiction, but in short form: to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the federal court must satisfy the long-arm statute of the state in which it sits (Missouri) as well as the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  Due process requires that a plaintiff show that a non-resident has “minimum contacts” with the forum state and that the maintenance of the lawsuit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”

The Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over Alibaba Holdings because Cepia failed to show that Alibaba Holdings “so controlled and dominated the affairs of Alibaba.Com that the latter’s corporate existence was disregarded” despite Alibaba Holdings’ ownership of the ALIBABA trademarks, ownership stake in <alibaba.com>, the two companies’ use of the same name and logo, and sharing a chairman for their separate boards of directors.  Moreover, the Court found that all the alleged acts were perpetrated by Alibaba.Com without direct input from Alibaba Holdings.[3]

Alibaba.Com, however, was subject to general (not just specific) personal jurisdiction.  Of greatest interest for other trademark owners facing problems on <alibaba.com>, are the reasons the Court gave for exercising general personal jurisdiction over Alibaba.Com.  They were: 1) the effect of Alibaba.Com’s alleged intellectual property infringement (a tort) would be felt by Cepia in Missouri; 2) Alibaba.Com had relationships with 1,211 third-party suppliers in Missouri – none of whichsold ZhuZhu merchandise; and 3) Alibaba.Com had two paid users from Missouri.  In the Court’s words:

Alibaba.Com’s commercial relationships with third party sellers are a critical aspect of its operation. Further, Alibaba.Com’s commercial relationships with third party sellers are not a one time event, but rather a continuing critical component of its business. Alibaba.Com maintains 1,211 such relationships with suppliers in Missouri. Accordingly, Alibaba.Com’s contacts with Missouri are systematic and continuous in such a manner that supports general personal jurisdiction. By maintaining systematic and continuous commercial relationships with at least 1,211 people or entities in Missouri, Alibaba.Com, has purposefully availed itself of Missouri’s laws.

Whether this Court’s analysis would hold up in another jurisdiction is an open question, but this decision likely raises the potential that Alibaba.Com can be sued anywhere in the U.S..  If Alibaba.Com has 1,211 sellers based in Missouri, there is a strong likelihood that it has a significant number of sellers in your state.

*          *          *

Phillip Barengolts is a partner with Pattishall, McAuliffe, Newbury, Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, a leading intellectual property law firm based in Chicago, Illinois.  Pattishall McAuliffe represents both plaintiffs and defendants in trademark, copyright, and unfair competition trials and appeals, and advises its clients on a broad range of domestic and international intellectual property matters, including brand protection, Internet, and e-commerce issues.  Mr. Barengolts’ practice focuses on litigation, transactions, and counseling in domestic and international trademark, trade dress, Internet, and copyright law.  He teaches trademark and copyright litigation at John Marshall Law School, and co-authored Trademark and Copyright Litigation, recently published by Oxford

[footnotes]

[1] Go to
http://www.zhuniverse.com/
 (you won’t be disappointed).

[3] The Court also declined to assert personal jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which permits a federal court to exercise jurisdiction over an entity that has sufficient contacts with the U.S. generally but not with any state in particular.

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